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THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY:
A POLITICAL AND LEGAL INNOVATION
GERHARD BEBRt
"Great economic and social forces flow with a tidal sweep over
communities that are only half-conscious of that which is befalling
them. Wise statesmen are those who foresee what time is thus bring-
ing, and endeavor to shape institutions and to mould men's thought
and purpose in accordance with the change that is silently surround-
ing them."
JOHN MORLEY, THE LIFE OF RIcHARD COBDEN 636 (1881)
THE Treaty 1 establishing the European Coal and Steel Community of
France, the West German Federal Republic, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands,
and Luxemburg has entered the first of its expected fifty years of operation.
The Community is a new type of international political 2 institution designed
to organize and maintain a common, competitive market for coal and steel. 3
Its supranational powers mark a basic departure from the conception of all
previous international organizations. 4 Its aims are explicitly stated by M.
Schuman himself in his original proposal:
tVisiting Lecturer in Law, Yale Law SchooL The author is indebted to Mr. J. P.
Jefferies, member of the Virginia bar, for valuable assistance in the preparation of this
article.
1. For the English text of the Treaty, see Parss AND INF0matATio.N Dvmsi:. o?' Tni
FRENCH En.BAssY, TRATY CONSTITUTING THE EURoPEAN COA..L AND STEML Co,,lumr,
(hereinafter cited as TREATY), together with ANNEXES, PRoToCoLs and the Co-vETmroz.
containing the Transitional Provisions, (hereinafter cited as ANEwxEs, Pnr_.ocois, and
CONVENTION respectively).
Because of the shortcomings of the English translation, frequent references will be
made to the original French text of the Treaty published in LA DoCINTATioN FRN-
C.AiSE Nz. 1489 (June 6,1951).
2. The political objectives of the Plan are so evident that Swiss public opinion has
voiced considerable reaction against Switzerland's participation in the Plan as being con-
trary to her traditional policy of neutrality. Suitzerlmd and the Schman Plan, 1 Swiss
REv. oF VoawD AxFAmS 6 (1951).
3. Whenever the expression "coal and steel" is used, it is meant to include not only
combustibles (pit-coal, briquettes of pit-coal, coke, lignite briquettes, and lignite) but also
iron ore, scrap iron, manganese ore, pig iron and ferro-alloys, raw and semi-finished
products of iron, ordinary and special steel, and hot-finished and finished products of iron.
See ANNExEs 83-90.
4. The French government vigorously insisted upon the formation of the Community's
supranational powers, as evidenced from the exchange of memoranda between the British
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"The pooling of coal and steel production will immediately assure
the establishment of a common basis for economic development,
which is the first step for a European federation, and which will
change the destiny of these regions which have long been devoted to
the production of arms to which they themselves were the first to
fall constantly victim." 5
The following discussion of this supranational experiment is an attempt to
evaluate the pertinent political and economic factors and analyze the Com-
munity's institutional structure.
EXISTING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
The political considerations, unquestionably instrumental in formulating
the Schuman Plan, were largely centered on the future position of Germany
within the East-West rift. The increasing political power of the West Ger-
man Federal Republic has changed the European political scene. It has raised
the question of future Franco-German relations and foredoomed the further
existence of the International Ruhr Authority controlling German heavy in-
dustry.6 The French government, realizing the consequences of this develop-
ment and recognizing the necessity of re-formulating West Germany's inter-
national position, has sought Germany's closer association with a Western
European scheme which would provide a safeguard against German armament
potential.7 The Plan would also counterbalance the strength of the Soviet
satellite system. The danger that West Germany, with its vital industry,
would be lured into the Soviet web by promises of political unification to Ger-
man nationalists, and by offers of vast and hungry markets within the Soviet
orbit to German industry, only stressed the need for West Germany's in-
clusion within a consolidated Western Europe.
and French governments. See the British White Paper, ANGLO-FRENCH DISCUSSION RE-
GARDING THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COAL, STEEL AND IRON IN-
DUSTRIES (Cind. 7970-Misc. No. 9) (1950); Reuter, La conception de pouvoir politlujt'
dans le Plan Schuman, 1 REvuE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE 258 (France 1951).
5. 22 DEPT STATE BULL. 936-7 (1950).
6. The German political parties, especially the Social Democrats, as well as the German
delegation to the Schuman Plan Conference, never failed to call attention to the necessity
of ending the operation of the Ruhr Authority. See MEYER, POLITICAL PARTIES IN WEsTmR
GERMANY 22 (1951). When the Plan came into operation, the Ruhr Authority was termi-
nated. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, BELGIUM,
FRANCE, LUXEMBURG, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMRIcA, RELATING
TO THE TERMINATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL AUTHOIUTY FOR TIE RUIIR
AND OF THE AGREEMENT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL AUTHORIrY FOR
THE RUHR (Cimd. 8705-Treaty Ser. No. 64) (1952). For a recent comparative study, see
Kaeckenbeeck, The Intenational Authority for the Ruhr and the Schuman Plan, 37 TIE
GROTIUS SOCIETY 4-22 (1952).
7. The proposed Treaty constituting the European Defense Community, signed on May
27, 1952, is a further elaboration of this French foreign policy. For the full text of this
Treaty and annexed Protocols, see SEN. ExEc. Doc. Q & R, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
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In addition to these political considerations, Europe's postwar economic
situation played an equally significant role. As a result of the destructive
effects of World War II, the pattern of international trade had undergone
pronounced changes, especially in Europe.8 The urgent need for re-equipping
its industries as well as the effects of the Iron Curtain's cutting Europe off
from its former sources of raw materials and food," were bound to lead to
unusually large imports from the United States.10 The net excess of imports
over exports and the loss of its foreign assets only intensified Europe's long
standing trade deficit with the United States and further aggravated the dollar
shortage." Europe's surpassing of pre-war production levels 12 must not, in
view of its increased population and United States financial assistance, be con-
sidered a sign of healthy recovery. 13
These difficulties of international trade, together with European efforts to
maintain full employment by protecting domestic industry and labor, have
resulted in a rigid pattern of intra-European trade. Bilateral trade agree-
ments, with their inherent tendency toward autarchy, have restrained the free
movement of goods, services, and capital. 14 Such an economic policy protected
weak domestic industry and, by limiting the size of the market, precluded
efficient mass production.'3 By disregarding the principle of comparative ad-
vantage,16 protectionism maintained high production costs and prices. Eu-
rope's high production costs were largely the result of international double
pricing of raw materials.'7 For example, against a domestic price for Lor-
S. Eco-o-uc SuRvEy OF EuRoPE SINCE THE W.: A REAPrsAL oF PnonrIXrs A-M
PROSPECTs (Research and Planning Div., Econ. Comm. for Europe, United Nations) 10-20
(E/ECE/157, 1953) (hereinafter cited as EcoNoMIc SURvEY OF EUROPE).
9. Developments in Trade Between Eastern and Westerj Europe from 1950 to Mid-
1952,4 EcoN. Buut. FOR EUROPE 34-78 (1952).
10. Eco~'omic SURvE OF EURoPE 19.
11. The dollar shortage is by no means a post-war phenomenon, as frequently assumed;
the disruptive effects of war have merely intensified and further aggravated the dollar im-
balance in world trade. HA,wTREY, THE BAIXNCE OF PAYMENTS AND THE STANDARD OF
LrviNG 30 et seq. (1950). But see Haberler, Dollar Shortage? in FOREIGN Ecoiomic PoucY
FOR THE UNnED STATES 426-45 (Harris ed. 1948).
12. Ecoxomic SURvEY OF EURoPE 7-9.
13. E.g., the Special Group of Experts of the Office of European Economic Cooperation
(Marshall Plan) estimates that Western Europe will be, by 1956, short of 25-35 million tons
of coal, OEEC, REP.: COAL & EUROPEAN EcoN. EXPANSION 60 (1952), a large part of which
is very likely to be imported from the United States. For further details, consult UNrru
NATiONS, ECONOMIc SunRVE OF EuROPE ix 1951 pp. 143-74 (1952).
14. WnI.LIAmS, ECONOMIC STABILITY IN A CHANGING VoRLDRS, 99, 137, 152 (1953).
15. EUROPEAN STEEL TRENDS IN THE SETTING OF THE Woa. MAn-r= (Econ. & Social
Council, Econ. Comm. for Europe, Steel Div., United Nations) 72 (E/ECE/112, E/ECE/
STEEL/42) (1949) (hereinafter cited as EUROPEAN S=t. TR.N Ds).
16. For analysis of this principle in the context of international trade, see Haberler,
Some Factors Affecting the Futiere of Intenzational Trade a:d Internatio:al Policy in
READINGS IN THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 530-2 (Ellis ed. 1949).
17. EUr oPEAxN STEEL TR.NDs 39, 66. E.g., it is estimated that the cost of raw material
is responsible for up to S0% of the price of pig iron, and 75% of the price of crude steel. For
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raine ore of 585 francs per ton, France charged an export price of no less
than 1,080 francs. German metallurgical coke was similarly double priced:
a domestic price of $12.60 per ton against an export price of $17.50.18 The
crippling effects of double pricing were further intensified by discriminatory
railroad freight rates,19 which, in view of the bulk of raw materials needed for
steel production, 20 considerably increased the price of steel. High steel prices
may choke any stimulus for increased demand and restrict the volume of pro-
duction and employment. They also handicap Europe's ability to compete
successfully with American products on the world market, and further frus-
trate attempts to alleviate the existing dollar deficit.
2 1
The nature and magnitude of post-war Europe's political and economic
problems necessitated new practices and institutions.2 2 Hence the Schuman
Plan came into existence, encompassing coal and steel, the backbones of a
modern economy. These industries require some degree of control because
they have difficulties in adjusting to changes in consumption, and are the first
industries affected by cyclical fluctuations in an economic system.
23
OBJECTIVES OF THE SCHUMAN PLAN
Common Market: The Plan's primary and immediate aims are economic.
It attempts to organize and maintain, within the European territory of the
Member States, 24 a common, competitive market for coal and steel. To this
end, the Member States of the Community are committed to abolish and pro-
hibit:
a general discussion of the raw material problem of the West European industries, consult
L'xNTLGRA ro ECONOMIQUE DE L'EUROPE 37-74 (De Sainte-Lorette ed. 1953). See also,
EcoNoMIc SURVEY OF EUROPE 229.
18. EUROPEAN STEEL TRENDS 65. See also, The Coal and Steel Industries of Western
Europe, 2 Ecox. BULL. FOR EUROPE 17, 29-36 (2d Quarter, 1950).
19. For the problem of transportation costs, see id. at 39-41. See also, HIGH AUroRTY,
REP. ON THE SITUATION OF THE CoMMuNr 69-75 (1953) (estimating that transport
charges currently represent 20-25% of the selling price of rolled steel). Discrimination in
transportation rates is bound to affect the price level substantially. HIGH AUTlORITY, THE
AcTivinEs OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 57-63 (1953).
20. It is estimated that the production of one ton of finished steel requires an average of
2-4 tons of iron ore, about 2 tons of coal, and over 1 ton of other material such as scrap iron,
fluxes, etc. EUROPEAN STEEL TRENns 40.
21. Id. at 39.
22. Fisher, The Future of International Economic Institutions, 1 YEARDOOK OF INT'L
AFFAIRs 178-201 (1947).
23. DAUGHERTY, DE CHAZEAU & STRATTO, THE ECONOMICS OF THE IRON AND STL
INDUSTRY 5, 32 (1937).
24. TREATY Art. 79, 1f 1 explicitly refers to European territories only. This excludes
the metropolitan area of French Algeria with its rich iron ore deposits which are of par-
ticular importance to the Italian steel industry. RAPPORT DE LA DALUGATION FRANgAISE 75
(1951) (hereinafter cited as RAPPORT). However, in trade involving coal or steel in the
non-European territories of a Member State, preferential treatment must be given to other
Member States. TREATY Art. 79, ff 2.
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"(a) import and export duties, or charges with an equivalent
effect, and quantitative restrictions on the movement of coal and
steel;
"(b) measures or practices discriminating among producers, among
buyers or among consumers, specifically as concerns prices, delivery
terms and transportation rates, as well as measures and practices
which hamper the buyer in the free choice of his supplier;
"(c) subsidies or state assistance, or special charges imposed by
the State, in any form whatsoever;
"(d) restrictive practices tending toward the division of markets
or the exploitation of the consumer."
20
By creating a common productive unit and market for coal and steel$0
the participating States have pooled resources representing fifteen percent of
their industrial production and constituting two-thirds of the world's steel ex-
ports.2 7 A dense railroad network, a cheap waterway transportation system,
and skilled manpower, all contribute substantially to the economic efficiency
of this "most powerful industrial basin in the world which history has
divided."2'  The proximity of the main production centers to the domestic
market, and to exporting harbors, rounds out the Community's favorable
economic conditions.
Many benefits are expected from an enlarged, common market with no
trade barriers. An expanded market is suitable for mass production tech-
niques, which are particularly important in the steel industry 2-0 with its neces-
sary concentration of production in large units requiring heavy capital invest-
ments00 Moreover, labor, natural resources, and capital are more productive-
ly utilized in a common market, thus reducing, through specialization, mod-
ernization, and expansion, the production costs of basic steel products.3' Free
from discriminatory trade practices, the common market should facilitate
movement of essential raw materials and result in cheaper procurement 2
The long range benefits of the common market are increased consumption and
25. Id. Art. 4. The common market has been in force for coal and iron ore since Feb.
10, 1953. HIGH AUTHORY, THE Ac-TrEs OF Ta. EunoPrpax Comvmiuxrvy 13; for steel
since May 1, 1953, 2 JoURAx.L Or-IcIEL DE LA COM=t3NAUT. EURoP NxN Du CHAE.o Ir
DEL'ACIER 113 ('May4, 1953).
26. An excellent map of the European coal and steel industries is attached to EurOPnEAx
SaE TRENDs. For tables on the main iron ore deposits and coal reserves, see Appndi-:
III, id. at 115-116.
27. HIGH AUTHORITY, REP. ON THE SITUATION OF THE COnUNITY 58 (1953).
28. Ibid.
29. EuRoPEAx S=r. TRxDs 40,61-3.
30. In 1949, the cost of building a modem integrated steel mill with an annual crude
steel capacity of one million tons was estimated at about 200 to 300 million dollars; in the
United States the figures quoted ran from 300 to 400 million dollars. Id. at 72.
31. Id. at 74.
32. HIGH AUTHORITY, REP. ON THE SITUATION OF THE Co=, uNTY 60-93 (1953).
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net consumer purchasing power, and thus an improved Community standard
of living."
But these expected benefits depend upon the condition of the steel market.
The steel industry plays a key role in the structure of any modern economy,
A decrease in the steel production caused by reduced steel consumption or
shortage of essential raw materials, is bound to cause unemployment not only
in steel mills but in steel consuming and transportation industries as well. 4
Consequently, the Plan seeks to meet and forestall situations likely to endanger
the steel industry. The Community assures this industry regular supplies of
iron, coal, and coke,3 5 if need be, by allocation. 36 Furthermore, by offering
coal miners and steel workers higher wages, improved working and living
conditions, and assistance against the hazard of unemployment, 7 the Com-
munity hopes to maintain an efficient and qualified labor force. Finally, regtt-
lar surveys of market conditions 38 and regulation of the flow of investment "I
should enable the Community to utilize fully the production capacity of the
steel industry.
40
The Member States' competitive positions in world trade are also expected
to improve. High production and lower prices of steel and capital goods will
permit increased exports either to dollar countries or to non-dollar areas able
to offer in exchange their agricultural products or raw materials. 41 In either
instance, such increased exports will result in dollar savings, help to cure the
dollar imbalance, and restore Europe's viability in world trade.
Competitive Market: The common market, established by the removal of
national trade barriers and discriminatory restrictions on coal and steel move-
ment, could not alone assure the benefits of competition. The coal and steel
33. For the complex roles of consumption and net consumer purchasing power in affect-
ing the standard of living, see INCOAIE STABILIZATION FOR A DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY 111-68,
339-478 (Millikan ed. 1953).
34. EUROPEAN STmEL TRENDS 73.
35. TREATY Art. 3 (a).
36. Id. Art. 59.
37. Id. Arts. 3(e), 68, 69; CONVENTION § 23. See RAPPORT 129-38; HIOU AUTIOITY,
REP. ON THE SITUATION OF THE COmmUNiTY 94-9 (1953) ; Roux, The Position of Labour
under the Schuman Plan, 55 INT'L LAB. REV. 289-320 (1952).
38. TREATY Art. 46. Pertinent information concerning market conditions is indispens-
able to a rational expansion of production. See Piou & ROBERTSON, ECONOMIC ESSAYS AND
ADDRESSES 38 (1931) ; EUROPEAN STEEL TRENDS 73-6.
39. TREATY Art. 54.
40. The role of public works projects in maintaining full production is also recognized
in the Treaty. Under Art. 57, the community may cooperate with Member States in plan-
ning these projects.
41. EcoNoMic SURVEY OF EUROPE 135 et seq.
In addition to increased exports, Europe's dependence could also be eased by reducing
dollar expenditures. Increased production and more economic use of coal will result in sub-
stantial dollar savings. OEEC, FOURTH REP.: EUROPE, THE WAY AHEAD 160 (1952) (esti-
mates that expenditures for coal imports from dollar areas could be reduced 400-500 million
dollars from 1951-52 expenditures).
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industries could continue to fix prices, restrict production and technology, and
allocate markets and raw materials. The Treaty seeks, therefore, to organize
and maintain a competitive as well as common market, free from any restric-
tive or monopolistic practices;43 to that end, it provides strong anti-cartel
and deconcentration provisions designed to prevent any abuse of the competi-
tive system. These provisions, directly enforceable within the Community,
represent the first instance of supranational legislation replacing the Member
State's anti-cartel and deconcentration laws in the field of coal and steel."
The anti-cartel provisions of Article 65 of the Treaty do not preclude non-
restrictive and non-discriminatory arrangements which further specialization
of production, or facilitate joint selling or buying. The Community, however,
must explicitly authorize these arrangements as essential, and capable of im-
proving production or marketing.4 5 Article 65 prohibits any agreement
"which would tend directly or indirectly to prevent, restrict or impede the
normal operation of competition within the single market."40 The scope of
Article 65 includes unauthorized agreements among two or more coal or steel
enterprises, distributors, or associations.4 I In addition, evidently following
the concept of "concerted actions" in United States antitrust laws,4  this
provision seeks to eliminate all implicit understandings which are manifested
by such concerted practices as price leadership, open prices, and the basing
point system. Instead of employing a subjective test, such as the intent of
42. Uri, Der Schuman Plan und gewisse Problme der intemationaln Volkseirt-
schaftslehre, 13 ZErrscHFr Ff ' NATIONAL6KONZOMIE 367 (1952).
43. For extensive treatment of the activities of monopolies and cartels, see UmTz
NATIONS STUDIES, INTERNATIONAL CART.S (1947); RzsTcmm Busm-rss PMCcES
(Economic and Social Council, United Nations) (E/2379, E/AC.37/2, and E/2379/Add.l,
E/AC. 37/2 Add. 1, April 29, 1953). Especially pertinent to the present article is Hnxzrm,
THE INTRLTioNAL STEEL CARTEL (1943).
44. For a convenient collection of European anticartel legislation, see REFoT o- THE
DE'T OF STATE TO THE SUBCOMM. ON MONOPOLY, SEm. COIT. ON SALL BUsINEss, F07-
EIGN LEGISLATION CONCERNING IMONOPOLY AND C.RrL PRAcricss (1952) ; TF-xT or NA-
TIONA L LEGISLATION AND OTHER GOVERMET.. MESURES RELATING TO REs'Icnvn BuSI-
NESS PRci E (Economic and Social Council, United Nations) (E/2379/Add2-
E/AC.37/2/Add.2 1953).
45. TRATY Art. 65 (2). See KIAWIELIcKY, DAS MoNoPoLvEm-r" im Scruu-AN: PZ:.;
23-6 (1952).
46. These forbidden agreements are automatically void and may not be invoked before
any court or tribunal of the Member States. Tmr.Ty Art. 0(4). The anti-cartel provisions
are retroactive; any agreement in force before establishment of the Community must be sub-
mitted for approval, and, if illegal, must be abandoned within a reasonable time limit fixed
by the High Authority. CoNvEaNTIoN § 12. See 2 JOURNAL Orc IEL DZ LA CoI.MUNAM-
EuIoP-ENE DU CHABON ET DE L'ACIER 138-9 (1953) (2 agreements denied approval).
47. TREATY Art. 65 is applicable not only to enterprises engaged in production of coal
or steel, but also to enterprises distributing these products to buyers who are not "domestic
consumers." Id. Art. 80. See RAPPORT 94.
48. See, e.g., MAcnLUP, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MONOFOLY 83-91, 127-68 (1949);
STOCKING & WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRIsE 132-233, 251 (1951).
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the parties, the Treaty judges these restrictive practices in terms of their
potential danger to, and effects upon, competition within the market, especially
with regard to prices, restrictions on production or technology, division of
markets and allocation of raw materials.
49
Since these anti-cartel provisions are applicable to business practices of the
coal, steel, and distributing enterprises within the Community, the way is left
open for export cartels.50 This seems to be a serious shortcoming of Article
65; particularly so, if one refers to the experience with the Webb-Pomerene
Act,51 designed to strengthen the export potential of United States industry.
This Act became in fact a convenient vehicle for introducing through the
back door the effects of cartel practices on the domestic market.5 2 It is ques-
tionable whether the Community will tolerate a similar development. 3 Certainly,
the Community is not entirely deprived of means to prevent it. It should be
noted that Article 65 makes no distinction between agreements of coal and
steel enterprises tending to introduce restrictive business practices within the
Community or outside of it. Article 65 only views such agreements in the
light of restrictive effects likely to occur within the Community. Thus, a re-
strictive agreement between two or more coal or steel enterprises forming
an export cartel would be void and the enterprises subject to sanctions if such
an agreement would have repercussions which might "indirectly" restrict
competition within the Community's market.
5 4
Abnormal concentrations of economic power are equally incompatible with,
and potentially dangerous to, free competition. To prevent such concentration,
Article 66 requires the Community's prior authorization for any transaction
49. TREATYArt. 65(1).
50. KRAWIELICKY, op. cit. sapra note 45, at 22; Ophiils, Das Wirtschaftsrecht des
Schuna plas, 4 NEUE JURISTiSCHE WocHENscHulFT 381-2 (Germany 1951).
51. 40 STAT. 516 (1918), 15 U.S.C. §§ 61 et seq. (1946).
52. STOCKING & WATXINS, CARTELS IN ACTION 200-02 (1946); Diamond, The Webb-
Pomerene Act and Export Trade Associations, 44 CoL. L. Rzv. 805, 827 (1944) ; I-late, Mo-
nopoly Abroad: the Antitrust Laws and Commerce in Foreign Areas, 31 TEXAS L. Rzv.
519-20, 523 (1953).
53. The possibility of forming a common export association was discussed at a recent
meeting of the coal and steel industrialists of the Member States. The anxiety among the
high officials of the Community caused by this discussion indicates their awareness of the
dangers inherent in such an association. [1953) THE ECONOMIST 78. See also Hiau Au-
THORITY, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMON MARKEr FOR STEEL-SPECIAL REPoRT 19,
31 (1953) (indicating that the High Authority is examining the compatibility of such an
association with the Treaty).
54. See L'INsTITUT DE RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES DE BRUXELLES, LA COMMUNAVaUT
EUROPIENE DU CHARBON ET DE L'AciER 172 (1953).
55. It should be noted that the deconcentration provisions of Art. 66 are not retroactive,
and do not apply to economic concentrations already in existence at the time the Community
was formed. However, Art. 66 does apply to any transactions consummated between the
signing of the Treaty and the date of its effectiveness, if this transaction was intended to
avoid the application of the deconcentration provisions. CONVENTION § 13, 1, See RAp-
PORT 97.
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involving at least one coal or steel enterprise, or distributors thereof, which
might lead to economic concentration by merger, sales of securities or assets,
loans, or "any other means of control."' ;" The Community will forbid any
transaction submitted for approval and declare illegal any economic concen-
trations already attained if they would or do "impair the maintenance of effec-
tive competition" in the coal or steel market within the Community.
The Community's control over economic concentration is broader than that
over restrictive business practices. Article 66 reaches third parties outside
coal and steel,5 7 as, for example, a German shipyard which merges with a
French steel mill, or a German chemical enterprise which gains control over
Ruhr coal mines. The Community's deconcentration power is also applicable to a
foreign national conducting his business from abroad, if his transaction im-
pairs, by concentration within the Community, effective competition in coal
or steel. Thus an American corporation which owns a Belgian rolling mill
would be subject to possible deconcentration if it acquires from a Swiss bank
a substantial control over a Luxemburg steel mill. Although the anti-cartel
provisions under Article 65 cannot be invoked unless two or more coal or steel
enterprises are involved, the deconcentration measures of Article 66 may apply
to transactions involving two enterprises within the Community, only one of
which need be in coal or steel.
Without resorting to control over other firms, a single coal or steel enter-
prise may expand and acquire a dominant position in the common market.
In such an instance a deconcentration order would be too drastic a deterrent
to economic growth ;5s therefore, the Community merely supervises this enter-
prise and intervenes only if it abuses its dominant position by protecting it-
self from effective competition in a substantial part of the market. The Com-
munity may recommend that this enterprise desist from practices incompatible
with the aims of the Treaty, and, in case of noncompliance, the Community
may set the modalities of sales and production which must be followed by the
defaulting enterprise.59 If the enterprise continues to disobey, pecuniary sanc-
tions are imposed.
60
Although the anti-cartel and deconcentration provisions are directed exclu-
sively to privately-owned enterprises, the Treaty also imposes certain limita-
tions upon the Member States. Articles 4(d) and 5 (2) oblige them "to assure
the establishment, the maintenance and the observance of normal conditions
of competition." By implication, compulsory cartel arrangements enacted by
56. See KRIwiEmIcKY, op. cit. supra note 45, at 57-S (discussing the application of Art.
66).
57. See RApoRT 93; KRAwIrELicxY, op. cit. mtpra note 45, at 645. Any "physical or
juridical persons who have acquired or regrouped or might acquire or regroup the rights
or assets in question" must submit necessary information upon the request of the Authority.
TREATY Arts. 47,66 (4).
58. RAPoRT 95.
59. TREArY Art. 66 (7). See KRAwimEcxCY, op. cit. supra note 45, at 93-100.
60. TREATY Arts. 58, 59,64.
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the Member States are prohibited. 61 On the other hand, a Member State's
right to nationalize its coal and steel industries appears to be unaffected by
the deconcentration provisions of the Treaty. This immunity may be deduced
from Article 83, which recognizes existing ownership, and from the intention
of the delegations at the Schuman Plan Conference.0 2 Therefore, the French
nationalized coal industry 03 is not subject to the deconcentration provisions.
Unquestionably, nationalization is an economic concentration under public
control. At this stage of the Community's political development, however, it
is inconceivable that a Member State would make its contemplated nationali-
zation of coal or steel dependent upon the Community's authorization. If the
nationalization of coal or steel is carried out by establishing economically in-
dependent public corporations " which comply with the rules of competition
as set forth by the Treaty, the Community will have no grounds for interven-
tion. Nonetheless, the Treaty seems to impose certain limitations as to the
form of nationalization. Should, for instance, the public ownership of such
enterprises end their independent operation, and establish, instead, a unified
State control which threatens free competition, the Community could inter-
vene and deal with the situation in accordance with Article 66(7) of the
Treaty which is applicable against an enterprise dominating certain sections
of the coal or steel markets.0 5
Transitory Period
By assuring the producers and consumers free and equal access to sources
of raw materials and production within the Community, powerful forces of
competition are released.60 These will eliminate throughout the Community
those enterprises which, because of their inefficient production methods, finan-
cial burdens, unfavorable physical conditions, and location (particularly with
regard to raw materials), are least productive and thus unable to compete.
Initially, however, the suddenly unleashed and unrestricted forces of competi-
tion would bring havoc to these weaker enterprises, and cause grave disturb-
ances within the economic system. A gradual organization, offering to the
weaker enterprises a breathing spell, assures a much smoother and less harm-
61. See KRAWmzucycy, op. cit. supra note 45, at 18-19.
62. See RAPPORT 100-102.
63. Loi relative a la nationalisation des conbustbles ininlraax, JOURNAL OFIcIEL
4272 (May 17, 1946), SIREY, Lois ANNorkEs 374 (1946). See Robson, Nationaliaed In-
dustries in Britain and France, 44 AMER. POL. Sci. Rzv. 304 et seq. (1948).
64. For the various forms of nationalization, see PROm.MS OF NATIONALIZED INDUSTRY
238-71 (Robson ed. 1952).
65. This intervention is permissible only if the enterprise abused its predominant posi-
tion'Gi order to attain objectives contrary to the aims of the Treaty. RAPPORT 102.
66. For a general discussion of some of the problems involved in establishing a common
market, see MEADE, PROBLEMS OF EcoNo Ic UNION (1953) ; FlsnER, EcoNoM1IC PRoGRESs
AND SOCIAL SECURITY 49 et seq. (1945) ; VINER, THE CusToMs UNION ISSUE 41-81 (1950).
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ful transition. To accomplish this, the Treaty provides for a five- to seven-
year period of adjustment,0 7 during which the Community, in cooperation
with the Member States, will financially assist 0s and grant temporary protec-
tion 69 to the weaker coal and steel enterprises.70
Financial assistance will aid beleaguered enterprises in specializing their
production, modernizing their methods, or otherwise modifying their activi-
ties,71 even to the extent of creating new ones outside the coal and steel in-
dustries.7 2 The enterprises which are forced to close are given preference in
establishing new industries. Before granting such financial assistance, the
Community must find the proposed project economically sound and capable
of providing employment for the released miners and steel workers. If these
adjustments cause unemployment, the Community contributes to the em-
ployee's unemployment compensation.73 The released workers will also re-
ceive financial assistance for their re-training and transfer to new industries.
In addition to this financial assistance, the Community, may grant temporary
protection, in the transitory period only, to coal mines whose operation costs
are too high to meet the immediate impact of competition (e.g., Belgian and
some French mines). 74 The subsidy fund is raised by imposing a levy upon
the most efficient and productive mines.75 Temporary protection is also as-
sured to weaker steel enterprises by restricting steel movements from one
region to another, or by fixing minimum prices and production quotas. 71
To adapt the coal and steel industries to the demand of an enlirged, com-
mon, and competitive market with a minimum of economic disturbance and
loss, is a formidable task requiring, above all, constant cooperation and guid-
67. CoNzvi rioN § 1 (4).
68. CoN-vEN IO- § 23. See RAPPORT 127-9.
69. Temporary protection measures for coal mines are listed in Com'-EnToN §§ 24, 26,
27; similar protections for the steel industries are found in id. §§ 29-31.
70. For discussion of the measures already taken, consult HIn AuTnoRITy, THE
AcTTvrEs oF THE EUROPEAN CommuN.ITY (1953) ; HIGH AUTHORITY, THE EsT.usfi-
MNT OF THE COMON MARKET FoR STEL-SEcnu RrTor (1953).
71. CowVE T'-§23(1).
72. Id. § 23(3).
73. Ibid.
74. Id. §§ 24-8. See 2 EcoN. Bum.. FOR Euo0PE 25 and Table 4 (2d Quarter, 1950);
Belgian 3Mines and the Schmnan Plan, [1951] THE EcoNomisT 1569-70; Delville, L'nd,,s-
trie charbonziMre belge d vant le Plan Sclman, 61 RmvE FrAuzco-BELGE 326-32 (1951).
Allotted subsidies to the Belgium collieries amount to 1,350 million Belgian francs, one-
half of which is to be provided by the Belgian government, and the other half by the Com-
munity. HIGH AUTHORITY, THE AcrvrriEs OF THE EunoPE,-.: ConmIun , S4 (1953).
75. The High Authority may impose a levy of up to 1.51 of the price of a ton of coal
sold. Co.-wETooN § 25. See HIGH AUTHORITY, THE AcrlvIsE OF THE ELMOPWQ: Col-
muNrr 52-4, 84-5 (1953) (0.55 Din. levy imposed on German mines; 0.42 fl. levy on Dutch
mines).
76. CoNV7ENnONz § 29. Section 30 permits the Italian government to maintain custom
duties for the protection of its steel industry, with the understanding that these duties will be
reduced annually, and completely eliminated by the end of the transition peried.
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ance.7 In all probability, uncontrolled forces of competition would not only
fail to establish such a market without ruinous effects, but also fail to check
powerful coal and steel enterprises, seldom void of monopolistic tendencies,78
in their quick expansion into the newly opened market. This stresses the
necessity for a supranational institution with independent powers.
POWERS AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY
To maintain the common, competitive market, the Community is granted
extensive powers over the activities of the coal and steel enterprises. It thus
replaces the Member States' sovereign powers over those industries.1 9 Ex-
ceptionally, the Community may also control enterprises outside coal and steel
if they are part of a forbidden economic concentration within these indus-
tries,80 as well as those which systematically discriminate and interfere with
the operation of the free coal and steel market. 8' To assess properly the extent
of the supranational character of the Community, it seems advisable to present
first a general survey of all the Community's powers, leaving aside for the
moment their distribution among its individual organs.
Power to Request Information: A permanent flow of information is neces-
sary for efficient discharge of the Community's wide range of functions. The
Community is empowered to request pertinent information from any coal or
steel enterprise directly,82 and, if necessary, to have the information verified
on the spot by Community officials.83 Moreover, the Community may consult
with various associations of producers, consumers, workers, and distributors
in the coal and steel industries.
84
Financial and Investment Powers: The Community may tax the average
value of an enterprise's products.8, Besides paying for administrative ex-
77. Mikesell, Economic Integration of Sovereign States: Some Fundamental Problems
in WILLIAMS, MONEY, TRADE AND ECONoMIc GROWTH 91 (1951); Robbins, Economic As-
pects of Federation in FEDERAL UNION 186 (Chaning-Pearce ed. 1940).
78. See Subcommittee on War Mobilization of Senate Committee on Military Affairs,
SEN. REP. No. 4 pursuant to S. REs. 107, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 68-9 (1944) (international
steel cartels). See also HEXNER, THE INTERNATIONAL STEE CARTEL 65-91 (1943).
79. For a frank admission that national sovereignty will be replaced, see Foreign Minis-
ter Schuman's statement to the French National Assembly, JOURNAL OrclElL, DkDATs
PARLEMENTAIRES, ASSEMR3LkE NATIONALE No. 150 p. 8895 (1951).
80. TR.EATY Art. 66 (1).
81. Id. Art. 63 (2).
82. Id. Art. 47, J1.
83. Id. Art. 86, 4.
84. Id. Art. 48, f 4. For restrictions on the types of producer associations with which
the Authority may consult, see p. 40 in!ra.
85. TREATY Arts. 49, 50(2). For 1953, the High Authority has fixed the levy at 0.3/o,
to be increased 0.2% every two months with a final rate of 0.9% by the end of the year.
Dicision No. 3-52, 1 JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA COMMUNAUTh EUROPfLENNE DU CHARBON ET
DE L'AcIER 4-6 (1952). The Authority estimates the income from levies at about 50 million
dollars. HIGH AUTHORITY, REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF THE COMMUNITY 137 (1953).
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penses, this "fiscal income" is designated for use as unemployment compen-
sation to workers released because of the introduction of new production
methods. These funds will also secure their re-employment by financing con-
version of the weaker enterprises. The Community will also use the funds
to finance technological improvements which will lower production costs, and
to support research in production, consumption, and labor safety.80
The amount of fiscal income may be too small to meet the capital investment
needs of the coal and steel enterprises. Consequently, the Community is au-
thorized to obtain additional funds, either by borrowing or by guaranteeing
loans secured by individual enterprises.87 In addition, the Community has the
power to direct the flow of investment to its most productive use. The pre-
vailing lack of capital investment in Europe on one hand,83 and the large
amount of financial outlay needed by the coal and steel enterprises on the
other,89 necessitate a coordination of investment policies in order to prevent
waste of Europe's scarce capital on projects relatively unimportant for
the economic stability of the Conmmunity.0" To avoid such waste, any
program of a coal and steel enterprise must, in accordance with the provisions
of Article 54, be submitted to the Community for approval. The Community's
disapproval of the investment plan bars the enterprise from access to any capi-
tal except its own funds.91 Thus the enterprises are greatly dependent upon
the economic policy of the Community which, guided by the over-all market
situation, regulates and directs the flow of capital, integrating the entire area
into one single coal and steel unit.
Power over Prices: Financial powers alone would hardly be adequate to
correct the impaired conditions of competition unless accompanied by some
control over prices in the common market. To achieve price stabilization
which would protect consumer, producer, and worker alike, the Community
has the power to determine price limits on commercial transactions made by
the coal and steel enterprises. 2 To protect the consumer against a sudden
86. TREA r Arts. 50 (1), 55 (1).
87. Id. Arts. 49,51(2).
88. See EcoxoMc SUrvEY OF EUROPE 198, 210-3; HIGH AUTHORITY, R 0,o ON THE
SITUATION OF THE COMIMUNITY 135-6 (1953).
89. The Authority estimates the volume of necessary annual investment, for the next
four or five years, at 400-500 million dollars for the steel industry, approxdmately 250 milliin
dollars for housing construction for miners, and 400450 million dollars, for the next few
years, for the coal industry. HIGH AuTHORITY, REPORT ON"i THE SITUATION OF TIlE CO-
SIuNITY 125,130,132 (1953).
90. See EUROPEAN STEEL TRENDs 74; WILLiAmS, EcoNomic STArnT IN THE CHANG-
ING WoRau 180 (1953).
91. The proportion of self-financing by the Community's coal and steel industries in
1952 is considerable: 44% in the coal industry, and 40% in the steel industry. Outside finan-
cial sources are banks and the capital market (coal, 31%c; steel, 26%) and governmental
assistance (coal, 25%; steel, 34%). HIGH AuTHoRITY, REPORT ON THE SrnI.oITo o1 THE
COMMxUITY 134 (1953).
92. TRAnTY Art. 61. See RAPORT 154-5.
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price increase caused by relative scarcity or exploitation by producers, the
Community may fix maximum prices for coal and steel products. Similarly,
to guard essential enterprises against economic crises which might eliminate
them, the Community is authorized to set a minimum price level. By fixing
minimum or maximum export prices, 93 the Community may regulate coal and
steel exports to meet the competition of foreign sources and the demands of
foreign markets.04 The Community's control over export prices might, in
view of the haziness of the anti-cartel provision on export cartels, be an appro-
priate and powerful weapon for combating such cartels.5
Powers over Production, Trade, and Consumption: Production control is
the greatest power the Community has at its disposal. Because of its drastic
nature and far-reaching effects upon most of the industries within the Member
States, this power can be invoked only in economic situations of utmost
gravity which cannot be remedied by any other means.90 Only a severe decline
in demand and the reduced production resulting therefrom give the Com-
munity the power to regulate production of coal or steel enterprises. 7 To
cope with the general effects of declining demand, the Community may estab-
lish production quotas and introduce quantitative import restrictions against
products from abroad. 98 These restrictive measures are not introduced to
maintain a price level-a motive so common to cartel practices-but rather
in order to redistribute the decreased demand and temporary production set-
backs throughout the Community. 9 Conversely, it may be necessary to mini-
mize the production disturbances created by a serious shortage of products.
In this situation, the Community may establish consumption priorities, allo-
cate natural resources, and impose export restrictions in order to assure an
adequate supply and distribution of raw materials and products within the
Community. 100
Powers over Wages: The improvement of living and working conditions
of the labor force in coal and steel is one of the fundamental objectives of the
Community.' 0x To achieve this goal, the Community has the power to deal
with an enterprise whose success is not attributable to its economic efficiency,
but rather to its relatively low wage level in comparison with average wages
in that region. The Community may require either the enterprise or the
Member State to remedy this existing wage discrepancy. 0 2
93. TREATY Art. 61(c).
94. See id. Art. 3 (a). See also RAPPORT 140.
95. RAPPORT 156.
96. TRATY Art. 57; id. Art. 5.
97. Id. Art. 58(1).
98. Id. Art. 58(1), (2).
99. RAPPORT 158.
100. TREAaY Art. 59.
101. Id. Art. 3(e).
102. Id. Arts. 68(2), (3). The Treaty seems to authorize Community intervention if
the unjust remuneration, which results in lowering the price level, affects the employer's
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Sanctions: To assure the observance and enforcement of the Treaty pro-
visions and the acts of the Community's organs, the Community may directly
impose sanctions-mostly pecuniary in nature-upon the violating enter-
prises. 1 3 For violations of its anti-cartel and deconcentration provisions, the
Treaty sets forth particularly strong sanctions. Restrictive agreements or de-
cisions violating the anti-cartel provisions of Article 65 are void and the parties
are subject to fines and daily payments.104 Under the deconcentration pro-
visions, the Community may, after having determined the illegality of such a
concentration, order the separation of enterprises or assets illegally merged,
and, if necessary, order their forced sale. 10 Against a Member State violat-
ing its Treaty commitments, the Community may engage in discriminatory
economic practices otherwise forbidden, thus temporarily excluding such a
State from the benefits of the common market.11'3
Minimum Community intervention is the underlying principle of the
Treaty.'"7 Free competition assured, the Community. except for control-
ling and checking monopolistic tendencies and economic concentration,
merely supervises the operation of the common market in an advisory capaci-
ty. With the appearance of an economic crisis, the Community's powers are
enhanced and it intervenes to restore normal and free competition within the
market. Although the Community's important powers over production and
prices are reserved for abnormal economic conditions and thus appear as
strictly emergency powers, it would be erroneous to consider the Community
weak. Since the coal and steel industries are frequently afflicted by such con-
ditions, the Community will have ample opportunity to exercise these powers.
regional competitors. The Treaty- "neither authorizes nor provides for positive pl1icy f,,r
the improvement of wages." Roux, The Position of Labour under the Selzun:au Plan, 55
INT'L LAB. REv. 316 (1952). When it does intervene, the Community directs its decision or
recommendation to the party-enterprise or State- which fixed the wage level
103. The Treaty imposes sanctions, for example, under Art. 47, ' 3 (failure to provide
information) ; Art. 50(3) (failure to pay tax levies) ; Art. 54, f1 (unauthorized invest-
ment) ; Art. 64 (price discrimination) ; Art. 5S(4) (violation of production quotas) ; Art.
59(7) (violation of measures taken to alleviate shortages of raw materials) ; iArt. 65(5)
(cartels); Art. 66(6) (economic concentration). It distinguishes between fines (des
amendes) which are imposed for past violations committed by the enterprise, and daily
penalty payments (des astreintes) which are imposed to deter future violations. See, e.g.,
Art. 47, 113.
One commentator has interpreted too narrowly the scope of the "sanctions" at the dis-
posal of the Community. KRAIaLicKY, op. Cit. supra note 45, at 42 (emphasizes pecuniary
sanctions). The Community, for example, may also suspend legal rights of a violator or
execute a forced sale of its assets. TnzAxr" Art. 66 (5).
104. TrxATY Art. 66(5).
105. Id. Arts. 66(5), (6).
106. Id. Art. 88.
107. Id. Arts. 5, 2, 57. See also Ophiils, Das WVirtschaflsrecht des Schurmanplan:s, 4
NKEru JunisnscE XVocErExxscHaFT 381, 382 (1951).
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Institutional Structure
The institutional structure of the Community, designed to represent and
protect the interests likely to be affected by the Community's operation, con-
sists of the High Authority, the main organ of the Community; the Consulta-
tive Committee, encompassing the special interests of producers, consumers,
workers and distributors; the Common Assembly, representing the peoples of
the Community; the Council of Ministers, representing the Member States;
and the Court of Justice.
The High Autharity administers as well as legislates the policies of the
common market.'0 8 It comprises nine members, who are nationals of the
Member States and serve a six-year term of office.' 00 A member of the Au-
thority is responsible to the Community alone,') enjoys immunity from any
legal action based upon 'his official acts,"' and is thus independent of his govern-
ment.
11 2
108. TREATY Art. 8. For details of the administrative machinery of the High Authority,
see HIGH AUTHORITY, REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF THE COMMUNITY 16-18 (1953).
109. TREATY Art. 9. No more than two persons of the same nationality may be mem-
bers at the same time. In order to stress the Authority's supranational character, the original
proposal stipulated five members, which would have left one State unrepresented. 1M=
VORTRXGE, PROBLEME DES SCHUMAN-PLANS 15 (1951). There is a gentleman's agreement
among the Member States that one member of the Authority will be a person having the
confidence of the trade unions of the Community. The Member States elect this official from
a list prepared jointly by the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions and The
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Roux, The Position of Labour Under the
Schuinan Plan, 55 INT'L LAD. REv. 295 (1952). The following are the present officers of The
High Authority: President, Jean Monnet, former Commissioner General of the French Na-
tional Planning Commission; First Vice-President, Franz Etzel, former Christian Demo-
cratic deputy and chairman of the Commission on Economic Affairs of the German Bundes-
haus; Second Vice-President, Albert Copp6, former Belgian Minister of Reconstruction,
Members: LUon Daum, former top executive in French steel enterprises; Heinz Pothoff, for-
mer head of the German delegation to the International Ruhr Authority; Kirk Spierenburg,
former director general of foreign economic relations in the Dutch Ministry of Economic
Affairs; Albert Wehrer, former Minister of Luxemburg to France; Enzo Giachero, former
vice-president of the Christian Democratic Party in the Italian Chamber of Deputies; Paul
Finet, former secretary-general of a Belgian trade union. 6 CHRON QUE DE POLMrUE
ETRaNRE 55 (Belgium 1953).
110. The members "shall exercise their function in complete independence, in the general
interest of the Community. In the fulfillment of their duties, they shall neither solicit nor
accept instructions from any Government or from any organiation. They will abstain from
all conduct incompatible with the supranational character of their functions." TREATY Art.
9, 5 (emphasis added). They are disqualified from "any business or professional activi-
ties, paid or unpaid [and cannot] acquire or hold, directly or indirectly, any interest in any
business related to coal and steel during their term of office or for a period of three years
thereafter." Id. Art. 9, ff 7.
111. PROTOcOLArt. 11.
112. The Community's Court of Justice has the exclusive power, on petition by the
Council or Authority, to remove a member who no longer fulfills the necessary qualifica-
tions, or has committed a "gross fault." TREATY Art. 12, 2.
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Because of the Authority's extensive powers, the appointment of its mem-
bers is of considerable importance to the Member States. For the first si:-
year term the States appointed eight members by unanimous agreement, leav-
ing the ninth to be chosen by the eight.11 3 In future elections, however, the
State control is somewhat decreased by requiring only a five-sixth's ma-
jority." 4 But even under this majority rule, the Member State retains a right
to veto the election of any member of the High Authority, whether such mem-
ber was elected by all the other States or by the eight members of the High
Authority.1 3 An explicit veto-and not a mere negative vote-defeats this
member's election. Since an unlimited use of such a veto would enable a
Member State to block the election of the High Authority's members indefi-
nitely, the Treaty limits a State's peremptory vetoes to four candidates.11 6
Every additional veto may, upon another State's appeal, be reviewed by the
Court of justice, which is authorized to declare the veto null and void if it
finds an "abusive" exercise of the veto power.1
7
The Consultative Committee is composed of an equal number of represen-
tatives from the associations of producers, consumers, workers, and distribu-
tors in the coal and steel industries, and secures their cooperation with the
Authority.llS Despite the consultative function of this Committee, the Mem-
ber States have retained the right to designate the eligible organizations of
producers' and workers' associations, and allocate seats among them; these
associations are merely entitled to prepare a list of their candidates.110 While
the selection of representative organizations of consumers and distributors is
left to those special interest groups themselves, 0 it is significant that the
States have reserved the right to designate representative organizations of in-
dustry and trade unions, representing politically important groups.
The Committee assists the Authority by making available the expert knowl-
edge and opinions of the coal and steel specialists. The Authority must, before
taking action, consult the Committee in specific instances prescribed by the
Treaty.' 2 ' Although the Committee's function is only advisory, a failure to
113. Id. Art. 10, 1. One commentator has apparently misinterpreted the selection
process. Loewenstein, The Union of l'estern Europe: Iihsion, and Reality-I, 52 CoL L.
REV. 95 (1951) (asserts that all nine members of Authority are picked by States).
114. TREATY" Art. 10, 1[ 5.
115. Id. Art. 10, I" 10.
116. Id. Art. 10, f" 11.
117. Ibid.
118. The number of members on the Committee may range from 30 to 51. Id. Art. 18,
11. The Council of Ministers has currently fixed the number of members at 51. For a list
of the current delegates, see JourA.L OrrIzCIE DE LA Co.ruziAuTr Europ- m Du
CHARRON Er DE L'AcaIm 11-14 (1953).
119. TREAr Art. 18, 1f 3.
120. Ibid.
121. Id. Art. 19, f 1. The Authority is obliged to consult the Consultative Committee
before taking action on: financial arrangements among enterprises, Art. 53; research, Art.
55 (2) ; financing projects, Art. 56; production quotas, Art. 58(1), (3) ; measures to combat
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consult would make the Authority's action faulty and subject to review by
the Court of Justice on an appeal by the Council of Ministers, a Member
State, or an enterprise directly affected by the action.
122
The Committee is also designed as a safeguard for the interests of the
special groups against any arbitrary acts of the Authority. The Authority
is obliged to notify the Committee of contemplated actions concerning invest-
ment regulation or enforcement of anti-cartel and deconcentration provisions ;1''
a proposed policy is thus subject to public scrutiny. Under this procedure,
the High Authority sounds out the opinion and reaction of the interest groups
to be affected, and may modify its course of action in order to assure their ade-
quate support. Although subordinate in its position, the Committee is thus in-
directly associated with the policy of the Authority.
124
The Common Assembly is a representative body for the peoples of the
Member States.1 25 The delegates from each Member State, who are either
directly elected by the people or appointed by the State's parliament from
among its membership, are spokesmen of their people rather than of their
governments.126The distribution of seats among the Member States reflects
their population rather than production potential.127 Except for the Assembly's
right to approve the annual report of the High Authority and possibly effect
its resignation, the Assembly serves primarily as a deliberating forum in
which the Authority's policies may be examined.
The Council of Ministers 128 is a body of six, each representing one of the
Member States. The Treaty explicitly requires that each Member State be
shortages of materials, Art. 59(1), (5), (6) ; price practices, Art. 60(1), (2) ; price levels,
Art. 61, 1f 1; subsidies, Art. 62; wage levels, Art. 68(2) ; and on any action not expressly
provided for in the Treaty, Art. 95, U 1.
The requirement that the Authority must consult with the Consultative Committee dis-
tinguishes the status of this Committee from that of the non-governmental organizations "ac-
credited" with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations under Art. 71 of the
U.N. Charter. In this respect Krause's comparison in his Betrachtungem iiber die Rcehtliche
Struktur der Europu ischen Geneinschaft ffir Kohle und Stahl in RECHTSPROBLME IN STAAT
UND KIRCHE FEsTScHRiFT FUR RUDOLF SMEND 191 (1952) is erroneous.
122. TREATY Art. 33.
123. Id. Art. 19, U 2.
124. RAPPORT 53.
125. TREATY Arts. 20, 21. The original French proposal did not include an Assembly.
At the beginning of the Schuman Plan Conference, the French modified their position by
proposing the formation of an inter-parliamentary Assembly to which the High Authority
would be responsible. N.Y. Times, June 22, 1950, p. 1, col. 1.
For a criticism of the present role of the Assembly, see Quelques aspects institutionnlets
du Plan Schuman, 67 REvUE Du DROIT PUBLIC Er DE LA SCIENCE POLinUE 105, 115 (Fanc
1951).
126. TREATY Arts. 20, 21, U 1. The term of office is one year. Ibid.
127. Id. Art. 21, U 2, assigns 18 seats each to France, Germany, and Italy, 10 to Belgium
and The Netherlands, and 4 to Luxemburg.
128. The original French proposal did not provide for a Council of Ministers. 22 Di,'T
STATE BULL 936-7 (1950). The opposition of the Belgian and Dutch governments to the
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represented by a member of its government in powerY 0  The Council of
.Ministers has been established to assure a constant coordination between the
acts of the High Authority and the States, and, in addition, to grant the
States an instrument for protecting their interests.130 The concurrence of
the Council which is necessary for many acts of the Authority, as well as the
frequent consultation between these two organs, will keep the States continu-
ously informed of the actions contemplated by the Authority. The 'Member
State will be able to explain to the Authority the possible injurious effects
which these actions are expected to have on its general economy.
The Court of Justice is the most independent of all the Community's organs.
Its seven judges are appointed by the Member States for six years.13' Al-
though the judges and the members of the High Authority are appointed by
the Member States, and both enjoy immunity from legal actions based upon
their official acts,'32 the States have reserved greater power in selecting judges,
since they must be unanimously appointed. A State's veto power over judicial
nominees is not limited as it is in the election of the Authority's members. On
the other hand, while the Authority's members must be nationals of the Mem-
ber States, nationals of other countries are eligible for judgeships.1 3
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS
The Community's institutional pattern reveals an intent to prevent an over-
concentration of powers in one organ and assure representation and protec-
extensive powers of the proposed High Authority, and their request that the Authority's
decisions be subject to approval by a Council of six Ministers of the particpating States,
The Schuman Plan in Progress, [1950] THE ECOxomisT 251-3, led finally to the establish-
ment of the Council of Ministers. See CoUNcIL oF EuRoPE, CONSULTATVE AssmExML, OFFi-
ciAL REPoRT oF DIEATEs, 3d Ord'y Sess., 192 (1951).
129. TREAY Art. 27, 1 1.
130. Id. Art. 26. See RAPPORT 28-9.
131. TRATY Art. 32.
The following jurists were appointed to the Court: Pilotti (Italy), President of the
Court; Delvaux (Belgium); Hammes (Luxemburg); Riese (West German Federal Re-
public) ; Rueff (France) ; van Kleffens (The Netherlands) ; Serrarens (The Netherlands).
The Judges are not required to meet the qualifications prescribed by the Member States
for local jurists. Thus economic experts may be appointed to perform the judicial function
on the Court. Schlochauer, Die Gerichisbarkcit der Europtischcn Genminsdiaft fjr Kohle
und Stald, 3 ARccrv DES V6LrERRECHTS 385, 3S9 (Germany 1952).
The French working paper contemplated an Arbitration Court proposed of five mem-
bers, one of which was to be appointed by the International Labor Office. Rou.x, The Posi-
tion of Labour under the Schuman Plan, 55 INTL LAB. REv. 292 (1952).
132. PROTOcOL Arts. 11, 15; CoDE oF THE CoTRT oF JusTicE Art. 3. The judges are
barred from holding political or administrative offices, and from affiliation with any business
or professional activity. Id. Art. 4.
133. RAPPORT 31-. . Nor does the Treaty impose any limitation on the number of judges
of the same nationality. The possibility of keeping two seats on the Court open for nationals
of non-Member States was discussed during the Treaty negotiations. Schlochauer, supra
note 131, at 389.
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tion of special interest groups, as well as of the public interests of the Mem-
ber States. An analysis along the traditional lines of separation of powers
would not convey a meaningful picture 184 of the complex power structure of
the Community. The powers of the Community are partly supranational,
and partly a merger of supranational and State powers wielded in a joint
decision-making process in which the Authority and the Council of Ministers,
representing the Community and States respectively, participate. Since no
precise line can be drawn, a functional description of various bodies and their
powers is preferable.
Supranational Powers
The Community's supranational powers are exercised by the High Au-
thority.13 5 A direct link exists between the coal and steel enterprises and the
Authority, whose decisions or recommendations are binding upon them with-
out any intermediary assistance of the States.18 0 When the Authority ad-
dresses a Member State, the enterprises are bound indirectly through the
State's commitment to implement the Authority's acts. In addition to the
binding decisions and recommendations, the Treaty provides the Authority
with a third course of action: the opinion. These three methods enable the
Authority to deal with the wide variety of economic problems in the most
effective manner.
13 7
Decisions ' 3 are the most far-reaching acts which the Authority has at
its disposal. A decision not only determines the ends an enterprise must
pursue, but also prescribes the specific means for attaining them. For example,
the Authority, in order to meet a raw material shortage, may decide on specific
production programs for an enterprise. 3 9
Recommendations, on the other hand, although binding as to objectives,
leave the choice of appropriate means to the enterprise or State. Thus the
Authority may recommend to a steel mill dominating a substantial part of the
market that it engage in such business practices as would ensure the mainten-
ance of free competition.' 40 The enterprise's disregard for such a recommen-
dation empowers the Authority to make a decision which may set prices or
134. For criticism of the "separation of powers" analysis, see McDougal, The Com-
parative Study of Law for Policy Purposes: Value Clarification as an Instrument of Demo-
cratic World Order, 61 YAIE L.J. 915 (1952).
135. The Authority's powers are exercised by the vote of a majority of its members.
TRv Art. 13, 1 1.
136. Id. Art. 14. For a discussion of the binding nature of those decisions and recom-
mendations, see Jaenicke, Die Europdische Gemeinsehaft fir Kohle lind Stahl, 14 ZErT-
SCHRIFT FOR AUSLXNDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECT UND V6LCERRECUxT 730-1 (1952).
137. Quelques aspects institutionnels do Plan Schuman, 67 REVUE Du DROIT PUBLIC ET
DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE 105, 111 (France 1951).
138. TREATY Art. 14.
139. Id. Art. 59(2).
140. Id. Art. 66(7).
[Vol. 63:1
1953] EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY 21
conditions of sale or establish production or delivery schedules.141 To abstain
from dictating specific administrative or legislative actions, the Authority may
address Member States in the form of a recommendation. 1 ' Under Article
73, for example, the Authority may issue corrective recommendations to a
State whose quantitative import or export controls have an unduly restrictive
effect on the competition within the Community's coal and steel market.
Opinions lack any binding force, and are issued by the Authority, usually
by request, for the guidance of the Member States or the coal and steel enter-
prises.
143
Under its supranational powers, the Authority may secure and verify
necessary information,'" set the Community's tax policy,14' regulate invest-
ment, 46 and determine domestic and export price levels-maximum and mini-
mum-for coal and steel produced within the Community 47 Similarly, the
Authority may regulate the wage levels which undesirably affect competition
in coal and steel,148 and establish conditions of sales to prevent or correct
discriminatory trade practices by enterprises or buyers in coal and steel.14
The Authority has exclusive power to impose sanctions for violations of the
Treaty or decisions thereunder.
The imposition of sanctions without assurance of their execution would
be of little practical value. The Authority, which lacks enforcement powers,
must rely on the cooperation which the Member States are obliged to pro-
vide.15 Financial obligations imposed by the Authority or any judgment by
the Court of Justice 111 must be enforced by the judiciary of the Member
States.15 2 A State's judiciary cannot question a certified decision of the Au-
thority.153 If an enterprise appeals the validity of the Authority's decision to
the Community's Court of justice, the power to enjoin the execution of the





143. TRaAT Art. 14.
144. Id. Arts. 47,l1;86,4.
145. Id. Arts. 49, 50(2).
146. Id. Art. 54.
147. Id. Art. 61. The Authority has already availed itself of this power and has estab-
lishtd maximum prices for coal and scrap iron. E.g., High Authority Decisions, 6, 7, 9, 10,
12, 13-15, 19-24, 2 JOURNAL O crELu. DE LA COMIUNAUTL ELTROPLE.ME DU Curmmo-. En" Dz
L'AcIER63-90 (1953).
148. TRATY Arts. 63(2), (3).
149. Id. Arts. 60(2) (a), 63(2) (a).
150. Id. Art. 86, 1 1.
151. Id. Art. 44.
152. Id. Art. 92.
153. Id. Art. 41. For the opinion that this restriction on the national judiciary may con-
fict with the Belgian Constitution, see Van der Meersch, Le Plan Schrm.an et la Co:sli-
tution Belge, 4 RE7uE DE LtUxIVERsII DE BRUXELLES 5, 31, 44-5 (Belgium 1951).
154. TREATY Arts. 92, fff 2,3; RAPPoRT 59.
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Limited Supranational Powers
For acts other than those mentioned, particularly for emergency measures,
the Authority needs the concurrence of the Council of Ministers.'5 The dif-
ficulty of foreseeing future emergency situations in the Treaty itself and the
danger of an arbitrary recognition by one body, partly explain the require-
ment that both the Authority and the Council concur on the existence of a
situation warranting the application of certain emergency measures. 16 Besides
this, the Council's concurrence introduces a method of control by the Member
States, the extent of which depends on the Council's voting procedure. The
requirements of an absolute majority, two-thirds majority, or unanimity of the
Council indicate the gradations of a single State's control. Generally, a State
has greater control when considerable repercussions on, and interference with,
its coal and steel industries and other sectors of its economy are expected to
result from the Authority's act.
Absolute Majority. The voting procedure of the six-minister Council takes
into account the coal and steel production capacities of the Member States.
The required absolute majority is attained only if a Member State "which
produces at least twenty percent of the total value of coal and steel produced
in the Community" sides with the majority.15 7 This qualification means that
either France or Germany must concur with the majority and that against
their joint stand the Authority cannot act; their negative vote in effect con-
stitutes a veto. And, if France and Germany both approve the Authority's
action, the Council's concurrence may be considered as given, even if the Coun-
cil's vote was an evenly divided deadlock. If, after a second deliberation, the
Authority upholds its original proposal, such proposal becomes an official act
of the Community. 58
To meet a menacing decline of demand or a scarcity of coal and steel, the
Authority may, with the Council's absolute majority, institute production
quotas, 59 export restrictions, °0 and, under certain conditions, quantitative
import restrictions.16' Even under normal conditions, the Authority needs
the Council's concurrence, given by absolute majority, for such actions likely
155. The Authority is committed to consult with the Council of Ministers in specific
circumstances. TREATYArts. 50(2) ; 51(1) ; 53,1 12(a) ; 59(6); 60(1) ; 61; 62; 66(l), (4);
67(2), (3) ; 68(5) ; 73, 112; and CONENTON §§ 11, 26(1), 29(2). Since the Authority is
not bound by the Council's opinion, and may act as it sees fit, this requirement to consult is
not an impairment of the Authority's supranational powers.
156. TREATY Arts. 58, 1; 74(3).
157. Id. Art.28, 3.
158. Ibid.
159. Id. Art. 58(1).
160. Id. Art. 59(5).
161. Id. Arts. 74(2), (3). The Authority may limit imports of coal and steel only if
the low price of these products resulted from "competitive" practices which the Treaty
would not condone within the Community; or when, during a period of declining demand,
increased imports of coal and steel would further depress an already low production level
within the Community.
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to affect a State's general economy. For instance, the Council's concurrence is
required if the Authority decides to finance new industrial activities outside
coal and steel in order to provide employment for workers released from coal
and steel industries as a result of new techniques and equipment introduced
in these industries. 162 An absolute majority of the Council is also needed
when the Authority is dealing with such fundamental aspects of economic
policy as determination of types of transactions which will be exempted from
the prior authorization required by the deconcentration provisions.163
Two-Thirds Majority. If a two-thirds majority vote is prescribed by the
Treaty, the votes are not "weighted" according to production capacity, and
a combined stand of France and Germany can be outvoted."" Since this con-
curring two-thirds majority vote of the Council is required for matters not
directly related to production-e.g., the imposition of sanctions against a de-
linquent Member State,1 5 or the increase in tax levies beyond the usual rate
of one percent' 6-- there is no reason to consider production capacity. A two-
thirds majority requirement which does not grant France and Germany a
privileged voting position is easier to obtain than an absolute majority with
its privileged voting. On the other hand, if the Council is deadlocked, its con-
currence may be easier to obtain under an absolute majority rule; if France
and Germany are on the approving side, the concurrence is considered as
given.167 Under a two-thirds majority rule, however, the Authority's action
would have been defeated. Yet, a two-thirds majority presently requires no
more votes than an absolute majority, since the present number of ministers
on the Council is six.
Unanimity. It is understandable that the unanimous concurrence of the
Council 10s is reserved for any act which is bound to change not only the
existing structure of the coal and steel industries, but also radically affect a
162. Id.Art.56,12(b) ; COxVENTIO §§23(3), (8).
163. TEaT oArt.66(3).
164. This interpretation is based on the fact that the Treaty explicitly "weights" the
votes of France and Germany on issues requiring an absolute majority, but makes no men-
tion of a privileged voting position for these countries on issues requiring a two-thirds
majority. However, some commentators hold that the votes are "weighted" in both in-
stances, and that the Treaty's silence is a mere oversight. See Raalte, The European Coal
and Steel Community: A Dutch View, 1 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 80 (1952); Reuter, La Con-
cepfion da Pouz'oir Politique dans to Plan Schuman, 1 R VUE Fa ANAIsE DZ SCIzxc;aF POIu-
TIQUE 273 (France 1951) ; Jaenicke, Die Europjische Kohle und Stahl Ge:cinshaf, 14
ZEITscmu r F R AUsLNDISCHES OFFENTLicHFs REcHT UND VBLKERRECRT 759 (Ger-
many 1952).
165. TREA Y Art. 88, 1 3.
166. Id. Art. 50(2) ; CoNvEnTIoN § 23(6).
167. TREATY Art. 28, 1 3.
16S. "[A] unanimous decision or unanimous concurrence... will be adopted if sup-
ported by the votes of all the members of the Council." Id. Art. 28, 1f 4 (emphasis added).
This seems to exclude the possibility of attaining unanimity if one member is absent or ab-
stains from voting.
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State's general economy. The grant or guarantee of loans by the Authority
for construction which will increase production or lower its cost, and thus
affect the future development of the coal or steel industry, is an example of
an act which requires the Council's unanimous concurrence.1 00
The strong position of the Council is perhaps best illustrated by Article
95. The Treaty could not foresee and deal with all possible future situations
which will require Authority action in order to effectuate the Community's
aims. In all such instances for which the Treaty makes no explicit provision,
the Authority will be able to act only if the Council concurs unanimously. 1 0
Unanimous Opposition of the Council. Presumably, the Authority may re-
scind and terminate most decisions or programs which it previously put into
effect. But some measures cannot be so easily abolished. For example, the
Council may block the termination of a program of production quotas either by
unanimous opposition if the proposal to terminate originated with the Authority,
or by simple majority if it came from a Member State.11 ' Similarly, the Au-
thority may not abolish raw material allocation systems if the Council unani-
mously opposes termination.
172
State Powers Preserved: Council's Exclusive Competence
The States have reserved the exclusive power to change the fundamental
institutional structure and powers of the Community, and formulate its foreign
economic policy. A unanimous Council may set foreign economic policy, 1 8
reduce the number of members on the High Authority,1 4 increase the num-
ber of judges on the Court,175 broaden the powers of the Community,11 0 and
admit new Member StatesY.7 7 Of all the Community's powers of intervention,
raw material allocation and consumption priorities affect the Member States'
economies most vitally. For this reason, in times of serious shortage, a unani-
mous Council may establish coal and steel consumption priorities, allocate
available raw materials among the Community's coal and steel enterprises, and
regulate their exports.178 The High Authority implements the Council's de-
cision and assigns manufacturing programs to individual coal and steel enter-
prises. 1
9
169. Id. Art. 54, 2.
170. Id. Art. 95, 1.
171. Id. Art.58(3).
172. Id. Art.59(6).
173. Id. Art. 72.
174. Id. Art. 9, 2.
175. Id. Art. 32, f 4.
176. Id. Art. 81.
177. Id. Art. 98. A new Member must be a "European State." Ibid. The admission of
new Members is one of the few instances where the Council is obliged, before making a
decision, to consult with the High Authority.
178. Id. Art. 59(2).
179. Ibid.
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Failure to Act
As a rule, in matters within their exclusive jurisdiction, the Authority and
the Council cannot undertake each other's functions, for such a delegation of
power would change the Community's institutional pattern and distribution
of power. For example, the Council can never perform any of the Authority's
supranational functions such as investigating enterprises, approving invest-
ment plans, or imposing sanctions. But the Council may discharge certain
functions which are within the limited supranational powers of the Authority,
if the Authority has failed to act. Thus, at the proposal of a State, a unani-
mous Council may request the Authority to take the necessary measures to
establish production quotas,' 80 and fix minimum or maximum domestic or
export prices.' 8 ' On the other hand, the Council may act directly to impose
export restrictions 182 or terminate a raw material allocation system.
183 Ex-
ceptionally, the Authority may also perform, though to a limited extent, the
functions incumbent upon the Council. If the Council, when a shortage exists,
fails to allocate raw materials among the Community's coal and steel enter-
prises, the Authority may allocate raw materials among the Member States,
whose governments are responsible for their further assignment to the enter-
prises.'84
Amendment Powers of the Community
The operation of the Community will, in all probability, reveal shortcomings
in the Treaty which will require amendments. For that purpose, a tvo-
thirds majority of the Council of 'Ministers may convoke a Conference of all
governments. 8 5 A proposed amendment must be unanimously accepted by
the States and ratified by their legislatures in accordance with their constitu-
tional processes.186 Such a procedure may involve considerable delay and,
furthermore, offer an opportunity for national interest groups to organize
pressure against the passage of the amendment. Perhaps for this reason, the
Community is granted an alternate, more flexible procedure of revising cer-
tain Treaty provisions. 8 7 It is applicable only to those provisions pertaining
to the exercise of the Authority's power;18s neither the objectives of the Com-
180. Id. Art. 59(l).
181. Id.Art.61, 4.
183. Id. Art. 59(5).
183. Id. Art 59(6).
184. Id. Art. 59(3). See RAPPoRT 164-6.
185. TPEATY Art. 96, 1 1. After the transition period, any Member State or the High
Authority may request the Council to convoke the Conference. Ibid.
186. Id. Art. 96, 2.
187. Id. Art. 95, 113,4.
188. "If, following the expiration of the transition period provided for by the Conven-
tion containing the transitional provisions, unforeseen difficulties which are brought out by
the experience in the means of application of the present Treaty, or a profound change in
the economic or technical conditions which effects the common coal and steel market directly,
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munity nor its power structure may be changed by this so-called "small re-
vision." Initiated by a joint proposal of a majority of the Authority and a two-
thirds majority of the Council, the amendment is then examined by the Court
which determines whether or not the substantive and procedural requirements
of a "small revision" have been followed. If the Court finds the proposed
amendment proper, it becomes effective when approved by a three-fourths
majority of the Common Assembly.18 9
SAFEGUARDS
The considerable powers conferred upon the Community call for effective
safeguards against their abuse. Certain safeguards are inherent in the peculiar
institutional structure of the Community: the prescribed cooperation between
the Council and the Authority; the Authority's compulsory consultation with
the Consultative Committee; and the Assembly's supervision over the Au-
thority's general policy.') 0 The Assembly is the weakest safeguard. Review-
ing the Authority's report in its annual session the Assembly may, by its
censure and two-thirds vote of no confidence, effect the resignation of all
members of the High Authority.191 Although the Assembly may also meet
in extraordinary sessions, either upon the request of a majority of its mem-
bers or of the Authority, 92 its right of censure is confined to its regular
annual meeting.193 As the Assembly cannot appoint members to the High
Authority, there is nothing which could prevent the Member States from re-
appointing the same members who were forced to resign.1'" At present the
Assembly is primarily a sounding board-a function indicated by the right of
the Assembly or any of its members to submit, at any time, questions to
the Authority, and have them answered.'9 5 Since the Assembly's deliberation
can, at best, only influence the future course of the Authority's actions, effec-
tive and immediate protection against specific recommendations and decisions
of the Authority must be sought in the Court of Justice.
The original conception of the Court is that individuals, coal and steel
enterprises and their professional associations, as well as Member States, are
should make necessary an adaptation of the rules concerning the exercise by the High Au-
thority... which are conferred upon it...." Id. Art. 95, 1f 3.
189. Id. Art. 95, 1 4.
190. Id. Art. 24. The Council of Ministers, on the other hand, is not responsible to the
Assembly, Quelques aspects institutionnels du Plan Schuman, 67 REvUE Du DROIT PUBLiC
T DELA SCIENcE POLITIQUE 105,116 (France 1951).
191. TREATY Art. 24, 3.
192. Id. Art. 22, 1 3.
193. Id. Art. 24, 1 2. At least a month prior to this meeting, the Authority must publish
a general report, id. Art. 17. The Assembly will discuss, and then entertain any motion to
censure this report. Id. Art. 24.
194. Jaenicke, Die Europiiische Kohl und Stahl Gemeinschaft, 14 ZnITscumFr F'OR
AusLXANDIscHEs OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 763-4 (Germany 1952).
195. TREAv Art. 23, 1 3.
[Vol. 63:1
EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY
granted access. For the first time, both the individual and the State may in-
voke the jurisdiction of an international court,1' ° whose main function is to
"ensure the rule of law in the interpretation and application of the present
Treaty and of its implementing regulations."' 07 Too unique to lend itself
to any traditional classification, the Court's jurisdiction will be described in
terms of the following functions :10s (a) review and annulment of the acts of
the various Community organs ;109 (b) review and modification of these acts
on their merits, and adjudication of tort claims ;00 (c) settlement of disputes
between Member States."0'
Review and Annulment of Acts
Jurisdiction to review and annul acts of the Community's organs is the
Court's most significant function.2 02 An appeal for annulment purports to re-
move as promptly as possible an allegedly deficient act which is either injurious
to some interests or contrary to the Treaty's objectives. A party's appeal is
196. L'Huillier, Une conquete dw droit adzinistratif fra):ais: lc onitenictux de la Con?-
mienautN Europenme da Charboi et de IAcicr, 14 RECUEIL DAU.oz: CroNIaur 63 (France,
Apr. 2, 1953).
197. TREaTY Art. 31. The Court's powers and functions follow the French tribunal,
Conseil d'Etat, which adjudicates issues under French administrative law. R.x'ro-v 34. In
this article, therefore, the various provisions of the Treaty dealing with the function and
powers of the Court will be analyzed with reference to principles of French administrative
law.
19& In addition to the three functions subsequently discussed in detail, the Court has
disciplinary jurisdiction over the members of the Authority: "Mtembers who no longer ful-
fill the conditions necessary to the exercise of their functions or who have committed a gross
fault may be removed from office by the Court on petition by the High Authority or Coun-
ciL" TarAT Art. 12, 1 2.
199. Id. Art. 33.
200. Id. Arts. 34,36,40,66(5). See RAPPORT37-43.
201. TEATY Arts. 10, 11; 18; 89. It may be noted that the Court of Justice cannot
render advisory opinions as does the International Court of Justice. STATUTE oF THE I.:.NT-
.NATI NAL CouRT OF JusTIcE Art. 65.
202. TREA Y Art. 33. In French administrative law, this appeal is called recours en
annulation, RAPPORT 34-7.
In the 1920's, the Upper Silesia Commission and the River Commission for the Danuba
and the Elbe provided for appeals from decisions of these organs to an international tnibunal.
Gros, Le problhe da recours jurisdictionel contre Ies dtisions d'organistnes inten:atio:aux,
1 LA TECHNIQUE ET LES PRINCIP'S DU Dnorr Punuc: ETUDEs Ez x'Ho:1iZEUR Dz G. SczuIE
267, 269 (France 1950). Also, the proposed Charter for an International Trade Organiza-
tion will enable a participating State, whose interests are prejudiced by a decision of the
International Trade Conference, to have the decision reviewed by the International Court of
Justice. U. S. CormRc- L Poucy SER. No. 114, Art. 96 (Dep't State 1943). However,
none of these examples of appellate jurisdiction over actions of an international govern-
mental organization involves the broad scope of subject matter over which the Court of
Justice has jurisdiction. See Guggenheim, La Validiti ct la Nullit des Acies Juridiques
Interyzationaux, 74 HAGUE RECUEM DES Couts 250-4 (1949).
19531
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exclusively directed against the validity of an act,20 3 and only the Court is
competent to declare it null and void.
An appeal for review and annulment may be based on any one of four grounds
of alleged deficiency: legal incompetence, substantial procedural violation, vio-
lation of the Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application, and mis-
application of power.20 4 Hypothetical acts of the Authority will serve as illus-
trations of these four types of legal deficiencies. If the Authority, which lacks
the necessary powers, determines the Community's foreign economic policy,
the act would be deficient on the ground of legal incompetence. And the Au-
thority grossly violates the procedure if it fails to consult the Consultative
Commiittee, as prescribed, or secure the necessary Council's concurrence. It vio-
lates the Treaty itself, for example, if it imposes sanctions upon enterprises which
did not engage in any illegal business practices. Finally, an appeal based on "mis-
application of power" attacks an act which the Community's organ had the
power to undertake but which was done in this instance for purposes other
than those declared by the Treaty. For example, the Authority misapplies its
granted power to regulate investment, if its motive for disallowing an invest-
ment project was to stifle competition within the Community.
Despite the common grounds, the extent of the right to appeal differs with
the appellant as well as with the nature and origin of the acts challenged.
The right of enterprises and associations in the coal and steel industries to
appeal is limited to acts of the High Authority specifically addressed to them
and affecting their interests.203 Although these and other private parties cannot
attack the acts of the Assembly or Council, 20 this limited appeal is an important
means of checking the Authority's supranational powers which are applied
against business activities. Thus a buyer may appeal an act of the Authority
203. See WALINE, TRAIT ELtMENTAIRE DE DROIT ADmIImSTPATIF 113 (1951) (French
administrative law) ; Josse, Extension et limites des competences du Conseil d'Etat sur les
actes, sutr les jurisdictio s, sur les ordres in LE CONSEIL D'ETAT, LIVRE JuiLArE 161, 171
(1952) (same) ; UHLER, REVIEW Or ADMINISTRATIVE Acts 34 (1942) (same).
204. STEINDORFF, Dia NICHTIGKEITSKLAGE im RECHT DER EUROPRISCuEN GEMEIN-
SCHAFT FOR KoHLE UND STAHL (1952).
The four types of legal deficiencies of the acts as set forth by the Treaty correspond to
the traditional classification of the French administrative law: l'incompe'tence; la violation
formelle d'une rbgle de droit; le %ice de forme; and le ditournment de pouvoir. WALINE,
op. cit. supra note 203, at 134-45; ROHKAM & PRATr, STUDIES IN FRENcu ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw 32-56 (1947) ; Josse, supra note 203, at 164-6.
205. TREATY Art. 33, 3. See WALINE, op. cit. supra note 203, at 113. Although a
party's interests may be injured by a specific act of the Authority addressed to a third person,
a strict interpretation of Art. 33 would preclude an appeal by the injured party since the act
was -not addressed to him. See STEINDORFF, op. cit. sipra note 204, at 26 (criticizing the
lack of appeal). However, these parties may challenge a general act which injured their
interests, if the Authority was guilty of a "misapplication of power." See L'Huillier, supra
note 196, at 65 (criticizing this right of appeal).
206. The right to appeal an act of the Assembly or Council is limted to the Authority
or a Member State. TREATY Art. 38, 1 1.
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which, because of his systematic violation of conditions of sales, deprived him of
access to the Community's coal and steel market.2 -7 Similarly, coal or steel
enterprises and associations may contest a ruling which declares their practices
illegal under the Community's anti-cartel provisions. -"0
A MKember State's right of appeal is broader than that of private parties.
It may not only dispute the validity of any act of the Authority which is
general and addressed to the entire Community, whether or not the State's
interests are specifically involved,-0 9 but it may also challenge the acts of the
Assembly or the Council on the grounds of legal incompetence or substantial
procedural violation.210 Although many acts of the Authority require the
Council's concurrence, the Treaty is silent on whether or not a State may also
challenge the validity of such a concurrence. Since the Treaty does not ex-
plicitly grant an appeal, it may be assumed that a State will be unable to
challenge a concurrence. But the Council's concurrence is such an important
institutional safeguard that a State's right of appeal should be sustained.
In addition to a right of appeal which is directed solely against the acts of
the Community's organs, a State may also challenge another State's action.
This appeal is available in the event that a State vetoes more than four
candidates for the High Authority.2 11 Since the veto is not an act of a Com-
munity organ, none of the four grounds of legal deficiencies are applicable,
and the appeal must be based, instead, on the ground that the exercise of the
veto was "abusive."
To assure the proper administration of the Community within the frame-
work of the Treaty, the Authority and the Council may challenge each other's
acts. The Council's right of appeal is broader than that of the Authority.
While the Council may appeal the Authority's acts on any of the four grounds
of legal deficiency,2  the Authority's challenge of the Council's acts is limited
to allegations of legal incompetence or substantial procedural violation.21 3 The
Council's lack of responsibility to the Community for any misapplication of
power or violation of the Treaty may seem striking and dangerous. However,
since the Community was created by the Member States, it may also be
changed by their mutual agreement which is expressed in the Council's unani-
mous action.m214 On the other hand, the Authority, and not the Council, may
207. Id. Art. 63 (2).
203. Id. Art. 65 (4).
209. Id. Art. 33, 1 1. See RAPPoRT 34. But see SEMnoarOF, op. cit. supra note 204, at
48 (interpreting the Treaty to allow appeal only when State interests are involvwd);
Schlochauer, supra note 131, at 401 (same). For the limited appeal of private parties against
a general act of the Authority, see note 205 supra.
210. TRATY Art. 38, IfI 1, 3.
211. Id. Art. 10, f 11.
212. Id. Art. 33, ir 1.
213. Id. Art. 33, 11 1, 3.
214. See RAPPORT 36-7.
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contest the Assembly's acts on the grounds of legal incompetence or substan-
tial procedural violation. 215 The Assembly is the only Community institution
which is denied a right of appeal.
Eligible parties may seek Court redress if their interests are injured by the
failure of the Authority to act. To prevent damage resulting from inaction,
enterprises and associations in coal and steel, as well as a State or the Coun-
cil, may bring to the attention of the Authority its failure to take decisions or
recommendations which are either required by the Treaty (e.g., breaking up
illegal economic concentration) or within the Authority's discretion (e.g.,
establishing maximum or minimum price levels) if the failure to exercise its
discretion constitutes a misapplication of power.210 If the Authority then
fails to act, such an implicit negative decision is, after two months, a ground
for appeal to the Court.217 The Court will determine whether or not the re-
quest for the Authority's action was justified; and if so, the Authority will
be required to act.2 15 The Treaty makes no provision in the event that the
Authority disregards the Court's judgment. It may be assumed, however,
that at least the coal and steel enterprises injured by such inaction, would
have a claim for damages.
219
The alleged legal deficiency of an act preconditions the extent of the Court's
review. To determine legal incompetence or substantial procedural violation,
it suffices for the Court merely to investigate the law pertinent to the pro-
cedure followed or the powers granted, without going into the merits of the
act or evaluating the facts on which the act was based.220 But this limited
investigation would be inadequate when the act is challenged as a misinter-
pretation of the Treaty or its implementing rules, or as a misapplication of
power. In such instances, the Treaty empowers the Court to examine the
facts underlying the act.221 And, since misapplication of power refers to "an
administrative act which, though within the legal competence of the agent, is
in reality done for another purpose than that which the law authorizing it had
215. TREATY Art. 38, 111 1, 3. The lack of appeal by the Council does not constitute a
restraint on the Member States, since a State may appeal an act of the Assembly. Ibid. The
Authority's right of appeal will be particularly important when the Assembly attempts to
censure the Authority's annual report, and effect the resignation of the Authority's mem-
bers. See p. 26 supra.
216. TREATY Art. 35, %ff 1, 2.
217. Id., 1f 3.
218. The requirement that the Authority take action after the Court's adverse judgment
is an implicit conclusion from Art. 35, which states that there can be an appeal from the
original failure to act. If the right of appeal is to have any meaning, it must be assumed
that the organs of the Community are required to heed the decision of the appellate body,
219. See TREATY Art 34, under which this claim could be brought.
220. RoYAm & PRATT, op. cit. supra note 204, at 37.
221. TREATY Art. 33, ff 1.
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in mind,"22- the Court must inquire into the organ's motive before deciding
the issue of whether or not to annul the act.am
In practice, it will be difficult to make a sharp distinction between a Court
review which is limited to the applicable law, and one which inquires into
the facts as well. Even an appeal based upon legal incompetence will force
the Court to examine certain pertinent facts, although it must not inquire into
motives. The complexity of this problem is apparent, for instance, when
the Court deals with an appeal challenging the competence of the Authority
on the ground that economic conditions did not legally warrant the Authority's
act. This might be the case when the Authority, on the basis of declining
demand, introduces a system of production quotas.2- 4 To determine whether
or not a decline of demand actually existed will require the Court's extensive
examination of the facts. It is evident that such an examination comes very
dose to, and perhaps is even undistinguishable from, both an evaluation of
facts and a review on the merits of the Authority's act,2- a review to which
the Court is theoretically entitled only in case of misapplication of power or
misinterpretation of the Treaty.
226
Review of Acts on the Merits and Adjudication of Tort Claims
(Plenary, Jitrisdiction)
In addition to its jurisdiction on appeals for annulment of acts, the Court
has jurisdiction to examine the economic expediency and necessity of the
Authority's acts, and, if it desires, to modify these acts.2I Tis plenary juris-
diction permits an unlimited evaluation of the economic situation; the Court
decides on the merit of the act itself, and thus controls, to a large extent, the
economic policy of the Community. 8s The Court's plenary jurisdiction - is
open to claims for restitution and damages against the Community, and is
limited to parties: (1) directly injured by a previously annulled act of the
222. Garner, French Administrative Law, 33 YALE LJ. 597, 609 (1924). For a detailed
discussion of the concept of misapplication of power (dtotnswnent de potvoir), see
WVuNa-, op. cit. supra note 203, at 142-5; ROHKAMt & PRnTr, op. cit. supra note 204, at 37-51.
223. RoHKAMa & PRATt, op. cit. supra note 204, at 37-9; Garner, supra note 222, at 613.
224. TRATY Art. 58(1).
225. This has been the experience under French administrative law. See Josse, spra
note 203, at 172.
226. TREATY Art. 33, ff 1.
227. Known in French administrative law as contentisux de pleine jirisdiction. See
WIALINE, op. cit. supra note 203, at 111.
228. One commentator has failed to make the important distinction beheen the Court's
annulment function and its unlimited plenary jurisdiction. Vernon, The Schi;:as Plan, 47
Am. J. INT'L L. 200 (1953).
229. In addition to the issues subsequently discussed in the text, the Court has plenary
jurisdiction over disputes arising out of private or public contracts concluded with, or on
behalf of, the Community, if the contracting parties agree to submit the controversy to the
Court. TanTY- Art. 42.
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High Authority; (2) directly injured by the operation of the Community;
or (3) penalized by the Authority's sanctions.
Damages Caused by an Official Act: The appeal for review and annulment
is an immediate remedy to prevent further injurious effects of the act con-
tested. Besides mere annulment, there is the necessity to grant a recovery
for damages already inflicted before the act was invalidated. The requirements
for claiming damages are more difficult to satisfy than those for annulment.
The Community's limited income and the difficulties in ascertaining the ex-
tent of damages, based by and large on the speculation as to what the situation
might have been had the deficient act not been undertaken, justify the limita-
tions on the Community's liability.
23 0
According to Article 34, only coal and steel enterprises may claim damages
caused by a deficient recommendation or decision of the Authority. How-
ever, this claim seems, at least implicitly, to be available to any person or enter-
prise affected by a deconcentration measure ordered by the Authority.
21
Thus, for example, an American corporation, owning enterprises within the
Community which are affected by an illegal deconcentration order, may claim
damages for the injury which it suffers as a result of that order.
The necessity of establishing the illegal nature of the Authority's act indi-
cates that the enterprise's claim must in any case be preceeded or accompanied
by the Court's annulment.23 2 The enterprises will recover damages only if
the injury was caused by an illegal official act of the Authority which implies
a "fault for which the Community is liable," and which injures the enter-
prises directly and particularly.23 3 The Treaty does not define the meaning
of such a "fault," leaving its definition and elaboration to the Court. It may
be assumed, however, that only seriously deficient acts-e.g., involving mis-
application of power-will justify a claim for damages. In determining whether
or not the nature of the damage resulting from such a "fault" is "direct," the
Court will, in all probability, maintain that the damage must stand in a direct
causal connection with the illegal act. This causal connection is evident when
the loss resulted from illegally imposed fines or, in the case of a buyer, from
illegal exclusion from the Community's coal market. The requirement of a
"particular" damage precludes any Community liability for acts which cause
general injury to many enterprises. The aggrieved enterprise must show that
its losses were "unique" and not similarly suffered by others as a result of
the Community's operations.
If the Court finds that the act is not only illegal, but also involves a fault
and damages as indicated above, the High Authority will be obliged to give
effect to the Court's annulment by granting equitable redress, primarily in
230. RAPPORT 38-9.
231. MucH, DxE AuTSHAFTUNG im RECHT DER EUROPAISCHEN G EINSCAFT FORL
KOHLE UND STAHL 93 (1952).
232. RAPPORT 39-40.
233. TREATTY Art. 34.
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the form of restitution,2 4 or if this is impossible, in the form of pecuniary
indemnities.2 35 If the Authority fails to take satisfactory measures, the injured
enterprise may return to the Court. At this time, however, the Court may
only grant pecuniary indemnities. 230
Injuries Resulting from the Operation of the Commu;nty: The Community
is liable not only for damages caused by an illegal official act of the High
Authority, but also for damages which result from a defective performance
of the Community's administrative service.2 7 The liabilities for official acts
and defective administration are mutually exclusive, precluding any double
recovery on tort claims.238 The Community's liability for administrative de-
ficiency covers injuries resulting from negligence on the part of the Com-
munity's officials. This liability covers actions which are merely coincidental
to the operation of the Community and which lack any attributes of an official
act. For example, violations of business secrecy 230 by a Community official
gives rise to a claim based on administrative deficiency. While the Com-
munity's liability for official acts usually entitles only coal or steel partici-
pants 240 to claim damages caused by an illegal recommendation or decision
of the Authority, the right to recover for injuries caused by an administrative
deficiency is open to anyone who suffers them.241 For example, the tortious
operation of a car owned by the Community would give the injured pedestrian
a claim based upon administrative deficiency. Since the injury was not caused
by an official act, there is no occasion for a preliminary annulment procedure,
and the injured party proceeds directly to the Court for an adjudication of
his tort claim. 212
The liability of the Community for administrative deficiency may be second-
ary to the personal liability of the Community official if the injury results
from his personal fault while performing his official function.24 3 But even
here, the Community is liable if the injured person fails to collect from the
234. E.g., reimbursement of illegally imposed fines or subsequent approval of an in-
vestment project illegally rejected.
235. RaPPoRr 37-S; Ophiils, Gcrichtsbarkcit wnd Rccltsspreclng inx Schm.n:an Plan,
4 NEU JuRIsTIca WocHE-scHR=r 693,695 (Germany 1951).
236. TRa Art. 34, 1f 2.
237. In French administrative lax: this liability is based on a faite de se-zicc, a principle
and term adopted by Art. 40 of the Treaty. The English translation of the Treaty-"fault
involved in an official act"--is incorrect and misleading. For a discussion of fuile de scr-
vice, and authority that it is not dependent upon the "officiar' nature of an act, see \VAu-.r,
op. cit. suspra note 203, at 356-61; RouiHar & PRrTT, op. cit. supra note 204, at 71-92; Gar-
ner, supra note 222, at 620-24. For a detailed discussion of the Community's responsibility
for a fate de serzce see MfucH, op. cit. supra note 231.
238. RAPPOrT 40.
239. TREATY Art. 47, 11 2,4.
240. For an illustration of another party who may claim damages, see p. 32 st[ra.
241. MucH, op. cit. supra note 231, at 93.
242. TRaT Art. 40, 1 1.
243. Id. Art. 40,112.
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responsible official.244 The Treaty does not elaborate on the distinction be-
tween these two liabilities. In French administrative law,2 40 the difference
between an impersonal, anonymous administrative fault and a personal fault
for which the official is responsible is sometimes very subtle.2 40 The gravity
of the official's personal fault appears to be a criterion for determining the
nature of the liability. Thus the tortious conduct of an intoxicated driver
of an official car will certainly be classified as a personal fault. On the other
hand, liability would rest with the Community, if it was negligent in employing
an official whose incompetence caused the injury. The dividing line between
the individual responsibility of the official and that of the Community will de-
pend considerably upon the Court's policy as to the extent of Community lia-
bility.
Sanctions: The imposition of sanctions is within the discretion of the High
Authority. To minimize the danger of arbitrary actions, the Treaty provides
that, before imposing sanctions upon violating enterprises or individuals involved
in an illegal economic concentration, the Authority must give these parties
a hearing. 247 Furthermore, in order to afford the opportunity of an early
appeal, the procedure is divided into two parts. First, the Authority deter-
mines in a preliminary decision the existence of a violation and the sanctions
to be imposed should the enterprise or individual at fault continue to dis-
obey the Treaty's provisions. Within one month after this preliminary de-
cision, an appeal may be brought to the Court. The Court's examination of
this preliminary decision is unlimited, and it may remove or reduce the sanc-
tions imposed.2 48 However, if the aggrieved party fails in its appeal or, with-
out attempting to appeal, disregards the Authority's preliminary decision, the
Authority may then order the execution of the sanctions already imposed.
Against such a decision, the party has only an appeal for annulment on any
of the four grounds of legal deficiency, 24 which theoretically precludes any
consideration of the sanctions on their merits.
Anyone who will be directly affected may appeal to the Court's plenary
jurisdiction against the Authority's preliminary decision declaring an eco-
nomic concentration illegal and ordering deconcentration.50 In deciding on
appeal whether or not the concentration is illegal, the Court will enter into an
unlimited economic evaluation of the facts which were the basis of this order,
and consider the deconcentration order on its merits.25 ,
244. Ibid.
245. For the reasons compelling an analysis of the Treaty's provisions in light of French
administrative law, see, e.g., notes 197 and 204 supra.
246. ROHKAm & PRATT, op. cit. supra note 204, at 75, 80.
247. TREATY Art. 36.
248. Id. Art. 36, 1 2. See RAPPORT 41-2.
249. TREATY Art. 36, 3.
250. Id. Arts. 66(5), (6); PROTOCOL ON TInE CODE OF THE CouRT Art. 43, ff 2.
251. TREATY Art. 66(5), 112.
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The Member State is similarly granted an appeal against the determination
and imposition of sanctions.252 If the Authority finds that a Member State
has failed to fulfill its obligations under the Treaty, it will make its findings
in a preliminary decision, and grant the State reasonable time for compliance.
The State may contest the preliminary decision by appealing to the plenary
jurisdiction of the Court which, evaluating all the circumstances, ,ill examine
the decision on its merits. If the State fails in its appeal, or, without seeking
an appeal, continues to disregard the Authority's decision requesting the ful-
filment of the State's obligations, the Authority may, with a two-thirds ma-
jority concurrence by the Council, suspend payments due to the delinquent
State or resort to economic discrimination. But even against this second
decision, the State has a right of appeal to the Court for a consideration on
the merits. This gradual pressure put upon the State has several advantages.
First, it gives the State an opportunity to recognize and correct its default,
thus avoiding hasty punishment which may evoke equally hasty reactions and
endanger the stability of the Community. Second, a Court confirmation of
the Authority's preliminary decision may not only influence the Council to
grant the concurrence required for the Authority's sanctions, but also per-
suade the violating State to rectify its default and comply with the Authority's
decision. 25
3
Disturbances in a Member State's Economy: The far-reaching powers of
the Court are best illustrated by its unlimited jurisdiction over a Member
State's appeal against any action or inaction of the Authority, which, in the
State's opinion, provokes fundamental and persistent disturbances in its
general economy.254 The State must first call the existence of such a situation
to the Authority's attention. If the Authority refuses to recognize it or fails
to take the necessary corrective measures, the State may appeal to the Court,
which will render a complete judgment on the merits of the situation. In-
stead of examining the legality of the act, the Court considers the expediency
of the Authority's position25 by evaluating this position in light of all the
essential economic facts. It assumes an unusual rule of an arbiter between the
interests of the complaining State and those of the entire Coal and Steel Com-
munity as represented by the Authority. The Court's judgment is final, and, if
adverse to the Authority, this organ must then implement the judgment by tak-
ing corrective measures.256 The formulation of the Community's economic
policy is thus yielded by the Authority to the Court.
252. Id. Art. SS.
253. If, for any reason, the sanctions imposed as a result of this lengthy procedure are
ineffective, the Authority "will lay the matter before the Council." Id. Art. 9S, f 5.
254. Id. Art. 37.
255. RAPpORT 42-3. One commentator has failed to recognize the true extent of the
Court's inquiry under its plenary jurisdiction. Loewenstein, The U:ion of WYestcn Europe:
Illhsio and Reality-I, 52 Co. L. REv. 55, 96 (1952) ("[T]he Court may not pass on the
validity of the High Authority's economic appraisal on which it based its decision...
256. TzRTY Art. 37, 1 4.
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Settlement of Disputes between Member States
On the traditionally international level, the Court has compulsory juris-
diction over disputes among Member States concerning the application and
interpretation of the Treaty.257 This jurisdiction would be invoked, for example,
when a State abridges the privileges and immunities of another State's dele-
gate to the Assembly.258 On matters related to the purposes of the Treaty,
the Court has jurisdiction only if the States involved agree to submit to the
Court's decision.259 Thus the Court's jurisdiction could be invoked to settle
a dispute arising out of a joint agreement between two Member States to build
a railroad which would serve coal and steel enterprises in both States. But,
if the dispute is not related, in the Court's opinion, to the purposes of the
Treaty, the Court must decline jurisdiction despite the submittal of the dispute
to the Court by the States.
CONCLUSION: DANGERS AND PROSPECTS OF THE COMMUNITY
The reaction of big industrialists, trade unions, and ultra-nationalistic politi-
cal parties reflects the far-reaching effects the Community may have upon the
existing structure of the coal and steel industries. The vigor of these assaults
cannot but caution against their acceptance at face value, and calls, therefore, for
their critical analysis and confrontation with the professed aims of the Com-
munity.
The Community is frequently accused of being nothing more than an inter-
national super-cartel. 260 The Community's institutional structure, particularly
the High Authority's mandatory consultation with the Consultative Com-
mittee,2 6' its public operation, 202 and broad judicial control 2' 0 -safeguards
hardly to be found in any cartel agreement, past or present-refute this charge.
Even a cursory comparison of the Treaty constituting the European Coal and
Steel Community with the earlier 1926 International Steel Agreement, "04
257. Id. Art. 89, 1. The Member States can "not ... avail themselves of any treaties,
conventions or agreements existing among them to submit any difference arising out of the
interpretation or application of the present Treaty to a method of settlement other than
those provided for herein." Id. Art. 87. See Mfinch, Die Gerichtsbarkeit im Sehunati-Plan
in GEGENWARTSPROBLEME DES INTERNATIONALEN RECHTES UND DER RECUTSPILOSOPnIE:
FESTSCHRIFT FOR RUDOLF LAUN 143-4 (Constantopoulos & Wehberg eds. 1953).
258. PROTOCOL ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE COMMUNITY Art. 16,
259. TREATY Art. 89, f 2.
260. See, e.g., Ulrich, Rjactions Allemandes, 6 DOCUMENTS 533 (France 1951).
261. Id. Art. 19.
262. Id. Arts. 15, 17.
263. Id. Arts. 33-8, 40.
264. For the text of the Agreement, see SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIS 1926 pp.
481-3 (Toynbee ed. 1928). For an authoritative description of the activities of the Interna-
tional Steel Cartel, see its publication Memorandum on the International Steel Cartel and the
International Sales Comptoirs (Jan. 1937) which by mistake was made available to U.S.
Military occupation authorities. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly
Power of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. IV-A 357-413,
Pt. IV-B 190-201 (1950).
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which established a steel cartel in France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxem-
burg, suffices to disclose the latter's disregard for maintaining free competi-
tion and reducing steel prices, and its indifference to the problems of labor.
Moreover, the 1926 Agreement did not purport to secure raw materials, ex-
change technical experience, or facilitate investment.2 5 On every issue, the
Schuman Plan compares most favorably, showing a firm resolution to serve
the entire Community instead of a limited group and its special interests. The
nature of this resolution could not be better illustrated than by the statement
of M. Jean Monnet, the actual framer of the Plan, asserting that "there can
be no Schuman Plan that will raise the living standards if cartels are per-
mitted."
2 66
Critics have objected to the Community's economic regime as introducing
a planned economy.-26 7 The pooling of the Member States' sovereign powers
over coal and steel, however, is necessary to create and maintain the common,
competitive market. Mere elimination of trade barriers and lenient enforce-
ment of inadequate national legislation regulating international cartels could
hardly assure such an objective.26 s M[oreover, steel industries of European
countries have practically never been competitive.2 9 "With the establish-
ment of the High Authority, international power has now been substituted
for the power of national governments, and public power for that of private
cartels. '270 In situations which might endanger the common market the Com-
munity intervenes to deter coal and steel enterprises from engaging in restric-
tive business practises which undermine free competition. The Community
can be described as a liberal economic system with a modicum of mild, re-
strained control that is particularly essential at the initial stages of develop-
ment.27 It "represents quite an original combination of liberalism and plan-
ning. We might say that it provides for a controlled system of free competi-
tion."
272
265. HE-x.ER, THE INTERNATIONAL Sm CARTam. 236-53 (1943).
266. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19,1951, p. 11, cols. 2, 3.
267. Flandin, Le Plan Schmnaan--Aspects Politiques, 16/17 NouvEL- REvuE Dr
L'EcooImm CONTEORAINE 7 (1950) ; Bandin, Le Plat Schuman et Socialisatlion, Id. at 23.
26S. On inefficiency of national legislation against restrictive practices of international
cartels, see HExNER, IxTERNATIoNAL CARLs 140 (1945) ; REsTruEcm Busxss PnAc-
ricEs (Economic and Social Council, United Nations) 45 (E/2379 and E/2379/Add.l,
1953).
269. MALjonIx, EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE WLD EcoNo'Y 54 (1953);
HIGH AUTHORITy, ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMON M.WRKEr FOI S=aa 29-30 (1953).
270. EcoNomic SuRvRy or EuRoPE 231.
271. Ophiils, Das Wirtschaftsrecht des Schumnan Plans, 4 NnuE JumsTzscHrs WoCH-
ENscH Fr 381 (Germany 1951).
"It is not our task to direct the production of coal and steel. That is the role of industry.
Our task is to establish and maintain conditions under which production will develop to the
best advantage of the common interest." MONNET, SPEECHES DEunEn BY PrX.ESIDT OF
THE HIGH AUTHORrTY 12 (1952).
272. A ARJoLN, op. cit. stpra note 269, at 51.
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Finally, the Plan is frequently objected to on the ground of possible Ger-
man domination of the Community. German domination is a danger result-
ing from the dependence of the French steel industry on imports of German
coke,2 7 3 and from the powerful production potential of German heavy industry.
However, the quantity of raw material necessary for producing steel might
be reduced by such new production methods as electric furnaces.2 74 It is dif-
ficult, therefore, to predict with certainty that French dependence on imported
coke is bound to establish German predominance. Of course, the Community
will fail entirely in its task if it allows German coal and steel industries to use
their natural advantage to destroy the competitive market.
Dangers of the Institutional Structure
The novelty of the Plan and its possible far-reaching effects on national
self-interests have prompted the Member States to reserve considerable
governmental control in the Community's operation. This explains the pres-
ent pattern of the Community's supranational structure-a structure still
primitive in some respects.
Aside from its vote of censure, the Assembly is presently denied the right
of initiative, of appeal against the Council's or High Authority's acts, or of
making appointments to the Court or Authority. Even budgetary control is
removed from its competence. Furthermore, the lack of supranational identi-
fication among the Community's population precludes, at present, the Assembly
from playing a constructive supranational roley.2 7 5 Eventually the Com-
munity, which is endowed with supranational powers, will also have to assume
a supranational responsibility for their exercise. Once there is evidence
of greater Community solidarity, it would seem that the Assembly should
play a more important and responsible part in pursuing the Community's
aims. If this is to be attained, the powers of the Council of Ministers, which
stands free of any individual or collective responsibility to the Community,
must be modified.2 7 6 The extensive participation of the Council in the work
of the High Authority will, in the course of future development, necessitate
the demand for some degree of Council responsibility to the Assembly.
Ultimately the Community is still dependent upon the willingness of States
to cooperate. Even the most ingenious supranational institutional structure
could not, at least in the beginning, dispense with the States' assistance. The
High Authority's supranational powers are primarily applied against enter-
prises rather than States, and if the States abuse their extensive, and perhaps
disproportionate, reserved power, the Community may fail. Whether or not
273. The Coal and Steel Industries of Western Europe, 2 EcoN. BULL. FOR EUROPE
20, 22, Table 1 on 18-19 (2d Quarter 1950).
274. Hearings, supra note 264, Pt. IV-A at 753-68.
275. Quelques aspects institutionnels du Plan Schuntan, 67 REVUE DU DRoT Puc Er
DE LA SCIENCE POLInQUE 105, 115 (France 1951).
276. Id. at 116.
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these powers will be abused depends on the constellation of political forces in the
States.277 The operation of the Community would be aggravated by a con-
siderably strengthened Social Democratic Part3 in Germany,278 and seriously
jeopardized by an increased Communist following in France2-0 or Italy.=Y 9
Since the States are the supporting pillars for the Community's supranational
structure, lack of State support or determined disruptive efforts would wreck
the Community and revive the national autarchy of the coal and steel industry.
It may be assumed, however, that this danger would diminish with the in-
creasingly successful operation of the Community, and that the advancing
integration of national coal and steel industries into one single economic area
would gradually strengthen the Community. The working together and reap-
ing of common benefit might substantially relax the nationalistic tension be-
tween the French and German people, and also decrease the dangers of a
State arbitrarily wrecking the Community. Once the benefits of the common
market are experienced by the consumer, producer and worker alike, they
will show a growing confidence in the Community, be more and more inclined
to seek protection and redress with the Community, and would very likely
throw their popular support behind it. A general success scored by the Com-
munity in its initial years of operation would forcibly demonstrate the advan-
tages of a supranational institution, which in the long run stands better
equipped to deal with matters common to all people.
Such a favorable development would be strengthened by the unifying impact
which the Community may have on the existing political, economic, and legal
systems of the Member States. Since the Court of Justice infringes upon a
State's monopoly of judicial power,28' constitutional amendments may be
necessary.282 Disparate tax systems of the States will be particularly affected.
277. For a convenient survey of the debates in the national legislatures of the Schuman
Plan countries, see 6 CHRONIQUE DE PoiaritruE ETNGP.n 7-52 (193).
278. See the antagonistic statement of Schumacher, the late leader of the German Social
Democratic Party, in the special session of the German Bundeshaus. 6 EurtoPA-Ancmv
3895 (Germany 1951).
279. For the extent and danger of Communist opposition to the Plan, see 7 Nuvs Froi
FRANcE 6-11 (1952).
280. See Garosci, The Italian Communist Part, in Coml .Uism ii; VnsrTmN EuroFE
154-218 (Einaudi ed. 1951).
281. See, e.g., TREATY Arts. 41,44.
282. Limitation of a State's sovereignty in favor of international organizations has been
included in most of the post-war constitutions of the Schuman Plan countries. Fr.;c
CoxsT. Preamble; ITAIAN CoxsT. Art. 11; BAsic LAw OF THE FEnL RXaunrc o,7 Gza-
msxY Arts. 24,25; DuTcH CoNsT. Art. 60.
For further discussion of this question see PRLLOT, PRL-cIs a Dnor Co:-sinzruo:nc -L
335 (1952); Friedrich, The Political Theory of the New Dcmocratic Constitutfons in
CoNsTrrTIONS AND CoNsTruTioxAL TRENDS SiNcE WORLD V II 28-9 (Zurcher ed.
1951); PALL=ER, Dn-ro CosnTuzi 0 o . 344-5 (1950); Vedovato, I Rapparli Intcr-
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If a relative equality of competition is to be established, gross disparities -8
must eventually be eliminated. No less consequential, particularly for the trade
unions, is the standard set forth by the Treaty for the producers associations.
In discharging its functions, the Authority may not only consult the Consulta-
tive Committee, but also individual producers' associations. To qualify for
such a consultative status, a producers' association must "give a satisfactory
place in [its] organization to the expression of the workers' and consumers'
interests." 284 The extent of the Community's impact on a State's legal system
is too complex to be dealt with here in detail. Attention may be called to the
effects inherent in enforcing the deconcentration and anti-discriminatory pro-
visions of the Treaty, which seriously affect the freedom of contract principle
enunciated in the laws of the Member States.285 Similar impact is to be expected
if the deconcentration provisions conflict with the acquisition of new economic
power under a State's marital and inheritance laws.280
Because the Community lacks its own law, other than in the Treaty, the
Court will be faced with a "conflicts" problem on the choice of the proper
substantive law. It is inconceivable that in adjudicating legal disputes to
which the Community is a party (e.g., credit transactions and employment
contracts) the Court would attempt to apply the diverse laws of the Member
States. Inequality would be introduced if, for example, the amount of damages
recoverable against the Community were dependent upon the situs of the
tort. The need for certain unification is evident, and the Court might fre-
quently find it necessary to formulate common principles to supplement or
supersede the specific laws of the Member States.
The possibilities mentioned are, of course, hardly more than a conjecture
of an anticipated unification process, whose precise trend and extent can be
ascertained only by the actual implementation of the Treaty itself.2 87 Its
broad principles-which serve as mere policy statements-clearly emphasize
nazionali dello Stato in CALAMANDREI & LEvi, COIIMMENTARIO SISTEMATICO ALLA COrTITU-
ZION ITALIANA 95-7 1950) ; Doemming, Fuesslein & Matz, Entstehungsgesdichte der Arli.
kel des Grundgesetzes, 1 JAHRBUCH DES OEFFENTLICHEN RECITS DER GEGENWART 222
(Germany 1951).
At present, only the Belgian Constitution poses constitutional difficulties. See Van der
Meersch, Le Plat Schuman et [a Constitution Beige, 4 REVUE DE L'UNIVR SITL' DE
BRUXELLES 5 (Belgium 1951) ; INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, CONSITUTIONAL AND PAIR-
LIAMENTARY INFORMATION 49 (3d Series, No. 14, April, 1953) (Belgian Council of State's
statement on the European Defense Community).
283. See HIGH AUTHORITY, THE AcriviTIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 90-3
(1953).
284. TREATY Art 48; COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CONSULTATIVE AssfimDY DOCUMENTS,
REP. ON THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, 3d Ord'y Sess., Pt. I, 444, 452 (1951).
285. See sources cited note 294 infra.
286. See Bayer, Das Privatrechit der Montanunion, 17 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSL(N-
DISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATECHT 325-81 (1952).
287. For a framework of inquiry on actual practices, see LASSWELL & KAPLAN, POWER
AND SOCIETY 143-73 (1950).
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the significance of the choice of persons called to serve on the main bodies
of the Community in general, and on the High Authority and Court in par-
ticular. Their political and economic outlook will substantially influence the
Community's future policy, and the molding of its economic system.2- 3 The
judges on the Court will certainly perform a unique function of creating a
supranational case law applicable throughout the Community.
The Coal and Steel Community in the Free World
Politically and economically, the Community is an organic part of Western
Europe and the Atlantic Alliance, and its future can be properly viewed only
within this broader framework. The effects of the Community's operation,
transcending its political frontiers, will affect the world's coal and steel trade.
Non-member states, tied up in one way or another with the States of the
Community, cannot afford to stay aloof. Thus, countries that produce steel
or export raw materials (e.g., Sweden,2 s Austria 20), or merely import from
the Community (e.g., Norway, Denmark, Switzerland 2 01 ) have found it neces-
sary to maintain permanent representation ith the High Authority. For
economic and political reasons, the permanent United States 22 and British 3
delegations are by far the most important. Politically, their informal partici-
pation might counterbalance any attempt by one of the powerful 'Member
States to dominate the Community. Economically, it may not only encourage
the investment expected to come from the United States,20 but also coordinate
the utilization of this investment with the programs of the British steel in-
288. For a somewhat unduly pessimistic viewpoint, se Edelman, The Council of Europe
1950, 27 IxT'L AFFAIRs 25 (1951), concluding that "[T]he conception of 'independent' in-
dividuals who would be entirely free from party, political, and commercial prejudice is one
which... has no reality at all; as individuals they would have their 'partial affections,' col-
lectively they would be thoroughly undemocratic." Id. at 27.
2S9. The Swedish Delegation was accredited with the High Authority on Dec. 10,
1952. HIGH AUTHORITY, THE AcrIVmEs OF THE EurzoPEAN Commtu.mT 25 (1953) ; the
significance of the representation is well illustrated by the fact that 28% of iron ore require-
ments of the Community in 1952 were met mainly by imports from Sweden and North
Africa. Id. at 39.
290. Austrian Consulate General, Information Dept., 6 Ausm~ul I.N lATO0 3 (No.
10, May 23, 1953).
291. HIGH AUTHORITY, THE AcrrvmEs OF THE EurOPLAm_ ComMv.rry 25 (1953).
292. 28 DEE 'T STATE Bum 352 (1953) ; HIGH AUTHORITY, REP. ON THE SITUATION OF
THE COmmUNITy 24 (1953).
293. Id. at 24, 31-4. As early as 1951, the Tripartite Declaration of the Foreign
Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France, disclosed the intention of the
British Government to establish the closest possible association with the European Coal
and Steel Community at all stages in its development. 25 DEPTr STATE BULl. 485 (1951).
294. For President Eisenhower's statement, urging United States loans to the European
Coal and Steel Community, see 28 DEP'T STATE BULL. 927-3 (1953). See alo Mutual
Security Act of 1951, 65 STAT. 373 (1951), as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 1651(b) (1952) (pro-
vides for direct appropriations to the Community).
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dustry.29 5 To further economic cooperation and avoid the overlapping of func-
tions, the Community has established liaison with the Organization for Euro-
pean Economic Cooperation (OEEC),290 the United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Europe,297 the International Labour Office (ILO),208 and, of
course, with the Council of Europe.
2 99
The Schuman Plan is the pioneer in the movement to consolidate
Western Europe. It may be followed by the still unratified treaty establish-
ing the European Defence Community, and the proposed European agricul-
tural,30° health,301 and transportation authorities. 0 2 However desirable the
aim, a single approach to the problem is not devoid of pitfalls. First, these
proposed authorities suffer from an almost servile imitation of the Com-
munity's institutional structure, which is conditioned by the peculiarities of
heavy industry.30  Second, the artificial dissection of organic economic ties
into separate economic organizations under independent authorities endangers
their viability. Their operation without proper coordination could conceiv-
ably result in wasted effort. This development can be curbed only by a
single authority which will control the essential segments of the European
economy. The establishment of this single authority is still very remote, and
will partly depend upon the success of the Schuman Plan experiment. The
draft of a European Political Community 0 4 is a beginning in this direction.
The European Coal and Steel Community is a new and necessary experi-
ment which seeks to foster peace and democracy. The ultimate choice is be-
tween a democratic, united Europe-created by free men through the demo-
295. British and Luxemburg, [1953] THE ECONOMIST 18-20.
296. TREATY Art. 93; Schilling, Der Europdische Wirtschaftsrat und die Europliische
Gemeinsclhft fiir Kohle und Stahl, 8 EUROPA-ARCHIV 5407-16 (Germany 1953).
297. TREATY Art. 93. See HIGH AUTHORITY, THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNiTY 28 (1953).
298. Accord concernant [a collaboration entre l'Organisatio Internationale dis Travail
et la Communautj Europenne du Charbon et de 'Acier, 2 JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA Com-
MUNAUTP- EUROPkENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER 167-8 (1953).
299. See PROTOCOL CONCERNING RELATIONS WITH THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE; HIGH AU-
THORITY, THE AcrVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 26-8 (1953).
300. See AMBASSADE DE FRANCE, SERVICE DE PRESS ET D'INFORMATION, FwCuII NOTE
ON THE ORGANIZATION OF A EUROPEAN AGRICULTURAL POOL (Doc. No. 46, June 26, 1951) ;
Mansholt, Toward European Integration; Beginnings it Agriculture, 31 FOREIGN AFFAMRS
106-13 (1952).
301. N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1952, p. 6. col. 3.
302. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS, REP. ON THE ESTAB-
LISHMENT OF A EUROPEAN TRANSPORT COUNCIL, 4th Ord'y Sess., 853 (1952).
303. ECONOMIC SURVEY OF EUROPE 234-5 (1953).
304. A draft of the treaty for the European Political Community is reprinted
in INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, CONSTITUTIONAL AND PARLIAMENTARY INFORMATION
52-101 (3d Ser., No. 14, April, 1953). See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CONSULTATIVE ASSEMrLY,
INTRODUCrORY REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE OF JURISTS ON TIlE PROBLEM OF A EUROPEAN
POLITICAL COMMUNITY (Doc. SG (52)2, 1952).
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cratic process and dedicated to the worth and dignity of the individual-and the
grave possibility of an enslaved Europe under the dictate and force of the
Soviets.
"Peace depends essentially on the creation of conditions which,
though they may not change the nature of men, will direct their
conduct towards each other into peaceful channels. That will be
one of the main consequences of the transformation of Europe with
which our Community is concerned.... In building up Europe, the
Europeans are laying the very foundations of Peace."' 5
305. Address by M. Monnet, Ambassade de France, Service de Press et d'Information,
SPEECHES AXD PEESS CO.NFERPEics No. 11, p. 3 (May, 1953).
